Rebuilding the City of Richmond: Congress\u27s Power to Authorize the States to Implement Race-Conscious Affirmative Action Plans by Daly, Mary C
Boston College Law Review
Volume 33
Issue 5 Number 5 Article 1
9-1-1992
Rebuilding the City of Richmond: Congress's
Power to Authorize the States to Implement Race-
Conscious Affirmative Action Plans
Mary C. Daly
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mary C. Daly, Rebuilding the City of Richmond: Congress's Power to Authorize the States to Implement
Race-Conscious Affirmative Action Plans, 33 B.C.L. Rev. 903 (1992),
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol33/iss5/1
BOSTON COLLEGE
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME XXXI I I
	
SEPTEMBER 1992	 NUMBER 5
REBUILDING THE CITY OF RICHMOND:
CONGRESS'S POWER TO AUTHORIZE THE
STATES TO IMPLEMENT RACE-CONSCIOUS
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PLANS -
MARY C. DALY*
INTRODUCTION 	 904
I. DEFINING EQUALITY: EQUAL ACCESS OR EQUAL
ACHIEVEMENTS  	 908
A. Origin of the Controversy 	  908
B. The Equal AccesslEqual Achievement Debate 
	 915
C. Equal Achievement: The Preferred Construct in the
Marketplace 
	 920
II. How THE COURT'S SELECTION OF THE STANDARD OF RE-
VIEW IN GOVERNMENT ACTION CASES REFLECTS ITS VAC-
ILLATION BETWEEN THE EQUAL ACCESS/EQUAL ACHIEVE-
MENT CONSTRUCTS  923
t Copyright 1992 Mary C. Daly
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law; J.D. 1972, Fordham
University School of Law; LL.M. 1978, New York University School of Law; Chief, Civil
Division, Office of the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, 1981-
1983. While serving as an Assistant United States Attorney, Professor Daly was trial counsel
to the defendants in Fullilove v. Klutznick and participated extensively in drafting the govern-
ment's brief on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
The author acknowledges her gratitude to all those who took time out from their busy
schedules to read and comment upon earlier drafts of this article, especially the members of
the Fordham Faculty Scholarship Colloquium and Professors Richard Delgado and Harold
S. Lewis, Jr.
903
904	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 33:903
A. The Standard of Review 	  923
B. The Cases: An Overview 	  924
1. The Equal Access Construct and State-Sponsored
Race-Conscious Preferences: Bakke, Wygant and
City of Richmond 	  924
2. The Equal Achievement Construct and Congres-
sionally Adopted Race-Conscious Preferences:
Fullilove and Metro Broadcasting 	 932
III. CONGRESS'S POWER UNDER SECTION 5 OF THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT TO PERMIT THE STATES TO ADOPT
RACE-CONSCIOUS PREFERENCES 	  935
IV. WHY CONGRESS SHOULD ACT 	  942
A. The Need for a National Policy 	 942
B. Accelerating the Economic Integration of Minorities 	 949
C. Recognizing Racism in the Work and Market Places 	  954
D. The Court, Diversification and Constitutional Values  	 958
V. A PROPOSAL FOR CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 	  963
A. The Important Governmental Purpose 	  966
B. Substantially Related Means 	 968
CONCLUSION  	 974
APPENDIX 	 977
INTRODUCTION
Among the most difficult issues with which the Supreme Court
has wrestled over the last two decades is the right of public officials
to consider an individual's race in making hiring, promotion and
contracting decisions. The Court's opinions interpreting constitu-
tional, statutory and administrative provisions have failed to estab-
lish clear guidelines to assist public officials and counsel in their
decision making.' At the heart of the Court's jurisprudential insta-
' Putting aside the enormously complicated moral issues involved in race-conscious pref-
erences, the task of determining what is and is not forbidden by antidiscrimination laws is
daunting. Dean William N. Hines of the University of Iowa Law School aptly captured the
frustration in observing, The law school is trying to do the right thing [regarding minority
student recruiting]. It's having a hard time trying to figure out just what that is." Somewhat
Affirmative Action: Law Schools Are Caught in a Bind Balancing Bias Remedies with Recruitment
Efforts, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 7, 1991, at I.
Federal officials are just as confused as public and private employers and contracting
authorities. See infra note 46 discussing the Reagan Administration's approval of race norm-
ing in the scoring of certain employment-related tests and the Bush Administration's disap-
proval. In 1990, the Department of Education announced that scholarships reserved for
minority university students were illegal. In the face of enormous public outcry, the Bush
Administration beat a hasty retreat from that position, allowing race/gender-specific schol-
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bility lies a profound vacillation between two very different notions
of equality: equal access and equal achievement. The equal access
construct defines equality in terms of the removal of overt barriers
to employment, contracting, housing, voting, and so forth. The
equal achievement construct goes beyond removal and adds a com-
pensatory element to make up for the lingering effects of years of
societal discrimination. In two recent cases, Metro Broadcasting, Inc.
v. FCC2 and City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,' the Supreme Court
carried this vacillation to a new frenzy. While permitting Congress
to define equality in terms of equal achievement, the Court denied
that same power to the states, cabining the states' definition to equal
access. 4
In doctrinal terms, the Court accomplished this striking bifur-
cation with relative ease. It held that race-conscious preferences
adopted by the states were subject to review under the strict scrutiny
standard, while those adopted by Congress were subject to the less
rigorous intermediate standard. 5 The net result of Metro Broadcast-
ing and City of Richmond is to make it next to impossible for states
to adopt race-conscious preferences in the absence of clear proof
of discrimination attributable to them. These decisions frustrate
local initiatives to eradicate the pervasive, lingering effects of public
and private discrimination.6 They endanger local initiatives that
arships donated by private sources. William Cells III, Court Questions Use of Race-Based Schol-
arships, N.Y, TIMES, Feb. 6, 1992, at Al5; Anthony DePalma, Theory and Practice Are at Odds
in New Proposal on Minority Scholarships, N.Y. TiMEs, Dec. 7, 1991, at 10; Carlyle C. Douglas,
A Learning Experience in Education Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1990, § 4, at 7. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently reversed an order of summary
judgment dismissing a complaint challenging a scholarship program for African-Americans
at the University of Maryland. Applying the Supreme Court's contemporary strict scrutiny
analysis, the court of appeals held that the race-specific scholarship program violated the
Equal Protection Clause unless it remedied the present effects of past discrimination by the
University. Podberesky v. Kirwan, 956 F,2d 52 (4th Cir. 1992). See generally infra notes 71-
125 and accompanying text.
2 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990).
' 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
See id.; 110 S. Ct. at 2997. Milwaukee County Pavers Ass'n v. Fiedler, 922 F.2d 419 (7th
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2261 (1991), strikingly illustrates the schizophrenic bifur-
cation of government power resulting from City of Richmond and Metro Broadcasting. In that
case, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit struck down a race-conscious program
adopted by the state of Wisconsin in its sovereign capacity. At the same time, it upheld 'an
identical race-conscious program adopted by Wisconsin as an "agent" of the federal govern-
ment. See infra notes 157-62 and accompanying text.
5 See Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3008-09; City of Richmond, 488 U.S. at 469.
6 The President of the Minority Business Enterprise Legal Defense and Education Fund
in commenting upon the City of Richmond decision observed that "the only means by which
minorities have been able to get access to these markets is through contracting
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have shown themselves to be effective in ending economic apart-
heid.
This article argues that Congress possesses the constitutional
power to authorize the states to adopt measures that effectively
define equality in terms of the equal achievement construct. Part I
highlights the general differences between the two approaches to
the notion of equality.' Part II analyzes the Court's affirmative
action jurisprudence, emphasizing its vacillation between the equal
access and equal achievement constructs. 8 Part III examines Con-
gress's power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to
permit the states to adopt race-conscious preferences.9 In Part IV,
the author advocates Congressional intervention to hasten the in-
tegration of minorities into the economic mainstream of the United
States.° Juxtaposing evidence of continuing wage and income dis-
parities between minorities and non-minorities with social science
data exposing employment and business discrimination, the author
proposes that economic diversity enter the lexicon of constitution-
ally acceptable justifications for race-conscious preferences. Part IV
also focuses attention on significant cases in which the Court has
acknowledged diversity in economic affairs as an appropriate sub-
programs. . . ." He feared a resurgence of "old-boy networking" among white contractors.
Nancy Lewis, Lawyers, Builders Disagree on Impact of High Court Decision on Set Asides; D.C.
Program Seen as Target for Law Suits After Ruling, WASH. Pos-r, Jan. 29, 1989, at A21. The
Court's decision jeopardized over 200 set-aside programs. Stephen Wermiel, Justices Limit
State Contracts Based on Race, WALL. Sr. J., Jan. 24, 1989, at A3. The Minority Business
Enterprise Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. ("MBELDEF") estimates that between
January 1989 and March I, 1991, approximately 41 Management Business Enterprise
("MBE") programs were subject to City of Richmond-based challenges. MBELDEF, Memoran-
dum dated March I, 1991 (on file in author's office) [hereinafter MBELDEF Memo'. E.g.,
Milwaukee County Pavers Ass'n, 992 F.2d at 419, discussed supra note 4; American Subcon-
tractors Ass'n v. City of Atlanta, 376 S.E.2d 662 (Ga. 1989) (set-aside invalid under the equal
protection clause of the Georgia Constitution for reasons similar to those given in City of
Richmond). See also Michigan Road Builders Ass'n, Inc. v. Milliken, 834 F.2d 583 (fith Cir.
1987), aff 'd, 489 U.S. 1061 (1989) (mem.). In addition, 65 jurisdictions voluntarily terminated
their MBE programs after City of Richmond. MBELDEF Memo, supra, at 21-25.
The impact of these cases and voluntary decisions can be devastating for both individual
minority contractors and minority contracting enterprises in general. When the Philadelphia
MBE program was struck down, MBE contracts with the city declined from 25% to 3.5% in
the 1990 fiscal year, representing a decline in revenue from $65 million to $21.3 million.
Tom Wicker, Toward the Idea, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 1991, at A25. As the percentage of
contracts awarded to MBEs shrinks, the employment rate of minority construction workers
declines. Barnett, just the Facts Ma'am, MBE MAG., Jan.—Feb. 1990, at 22.
See infra notes 14-68 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 69-125 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 126-62 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 163-256 and accompanying text.
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ject matter for decision making by the political branches of govern-
ment." Finally, Part V outlines the substantive parameters of the
proposed Congressional legislation. 12
The legislation called for in this article has many advantages.
First, it will reflect a national consensus on the circumstances justi-
fying the adoption of race-conscious preferences by thousands of
state and municipal agencies. Nationwide standards will promote
fairness in employment and business for both minorities and non-
minorities. At the same time, the legislation will respect federalism
principles by leaving the initial decision to adopt race-conscious
preferences to the states and municipalities. Second, the legislation
will foster full participation of minorities in the United States econ-
omy. While strengthening the nation internally, it will also enable
the country to compete more effectively in a global economy. Third,
in light of the changing racial and ethnic demographics of the
nation's labor pool, it will counterbalance the educational and social
malfunctioning that tends toward producing a plantation economy,
in which power and mobility are lodged with non-minorities.
Finally, this legislation represents a natural progression in the
nation's understanding of racial discrimination and commitment to
its eradication. As the twenty-first century approaches, Congress
must break away from strategies designed to overcome the exclusion
of minorities and instead promote strategies designed to ensure
inclusion. Congress took the first step in this new direction last year
with the adoption of the Glass Ceiling Act of 1991.' 3 That statute
affirmatively acknowledged the importance of diversity in the work
and market places and conceded the nation's poor record in assur-
ing the much-needed diversity. It called for further study of the
issue and appointed a commission to conduct a comprehensive
review of management decision making. The next step in establish-
ing a national policy of inclusion is incremental and hardly radical.
Congress must permit the states, if they so elect, to foster diversity
" See infra notes 228-56 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 257-301 and accompanying text.
13 Glass Ceiling Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1081 (1991). Labor economists
and management experts have coined the term "glass ceiling" to describe the absence of
minorities and women at the upper rungs of corporate career ladders. The Department of
Labor has defined it as "those artificial barriers based on attitudinal or organizational bias
that prevent qualified individuals from advancing upward into their organization into man-
agement-level positions." U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, A REPORT ON TIIE GLASS CEILING INITIATIVE.
1 (1990) [hereinafter GLASS CEILING]. This phenomenon is also described as a career "pla-
teau," a point beyond which advancement rarely occurs. Id. at 4. See Diana B. Henriques,
Piercing Wall Street's Lucite Ceiling, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1 1, 1991, § 3, at 1.
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in their employment and commercial settings. The time has come
to permit the City of Richmond to rebuild itself and dismantle the
glass ceiling, assuring equality of achievement in the work and
market places.
I. DEFINING EQUALITY: EQUAL ACCESS OR EQUAL ACHIEVEMENT?
A. Origin of the Controversy
No issues have more continuously rent the fabric of American
political and constitutional life than those surrounding the securing
of the promise of equality first pronounced in the Declaration of
Independence. As the historian Richard Morris has so ably pointed
out, "We, the people" was a profoundly exclusionary concept, leav-
ing no place in the body politic for African-Americans, women or
non-propertied white males." The political and moral battle to
dismantle the barrier of racial exclusion culminated in the Civil
War, turning state against state, family against family, and brother
against brother.' 5 For a short while, the quest for equality continued
after the guns of war were silenced. Regrettably, the country too
quickly abandoned the enormous task of opening the nation's po-
litical and economic infrastructure in a meaningful way to the newly
emancipated slaves.' 6 The Supreme Court's calamitous opinion in
Dred Scott 17 left the legislative and executive branches constitution-
ally paralyzed, unable to prevent the Civil War through political
compromise. The Court proved no wiser after the war, issuing a
series of opinions that effectively bolted the door of the courthouse
to seekers of racial equality and justice.'m
14 RICHARD B. MORRIS, THE FORGING OF THE UNION: 1781-1789,163-93 (1987); STA-
TUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL RIGHTS 4-6 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1970)
[hereinafter CIVIL RIGHTS].
15 E.g., HENRY S. COMMAGER, 1 THE BLUE AND THE GREY: THE STORY OF THE CIVIL WAR
AS TOLD BY PARTICIPANTS (1951); JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE
CIVIL WAR ERA (1988); CHARLES ROYSTER, THE DESTRUCTIVE WAR: WILLIAM TECUMSEH
SHERMAN, STONEWALL JACKSON AND THE AMERICANS (1991).
' 6
 C. VANN WOODWARD, REUNION & REACTION: THE COMPROMISE OF 1877 AND TIIE END
OF RECONSTRUCTION (1951).
17 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
" Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906) (Civil Rights Act of 1866); James v.
Bowman, 190 U.S. 127 (1903) (Enforcement Act); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883)
(Civil Rights Act of 1875); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883) (Ku Klux Klan Act);
United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876) (Enforcement Act); The Slaughter-House Cases.
83 U.S. 36 (1872) (Civil Rights Act of 1875). See also Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)
(upholding state-mandated de jure segregation). See genera/4 CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 14.
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First cautiously,'" and then with bold strokes, 2° the Supreme
Court after the Second World War mobilized the country to resume
the barely begun task of opening the political and economic infra-
structure. Responding to the fury and strength of the Civil Rights
movement, the President finally joined the Court in endeavoring to
fulfill the promise of equality. The most significant Executive
Branch action was President Johnson's issuance of Executive Order
11,246, that required most contractors with the federal government
to "take affirmative action to ensure that the applicants are em-
ployed, and that employees are treated during employment, without
regard to their race, color, religion, sex or national origin."2 ' The
agencies charged with enforcing Executive Order 11,246 insisted
upon sophisticated structural analyses of the employer-contractor's
workforce, which frequently resulted in findings of underutilization
of women and minorities. In turn, the findings led contractors to
adopt "goals" and "timetables" for diversifying their workforce.
The Legislative Branch followed suit. The 1960s witnessed the
enactment of sweeping legislation designed to eradicate racial dis-
19 Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Shelley
v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Smith v. Allwright, 32l U.S. 649 (1944); Nixon v. Condon,
286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
a° The Supreme Court later moved decisively to ban government segregation. Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (segregated schools in the District of Columbia); Brown v. Board
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (segregated state public schools). Accord New Orleans City Park
Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (per curiam) (public parks and golf
courses); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per curiam) (municipal golf course);
Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (per curiam) (public beaches and bath
houses); Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'it, 347 U.S. 971 (1954) (per curiam) (amphi-
theater in city park).
As part of its crusade to end segregation, the Court also acknowledged sweeping power
in Congress to use the Civil Rights Amendments to outlaw private and public discrimination.
E.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 4{)9 (1968) (Thirteenth Amendment); Katzen-
bach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (Fourteenth Amendment); South Carolina v. Katzen-
bach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (Fifteenth Amendment). Discussions of segregation and the Civil
Rights movement easily Fall into the trap of treating discrimination as a Southern phenom-
enon. The North was hardly immune from racial bias. E.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S.
717 (1974) (education); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U,S. 189 (1973) (same); Detroit
Police Officers Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 917 (1980)
(employment); United States v. City of Chicago, 573 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1978) (same). Labor
unions, especially in the construction industry, are particularly resistant to integration. See
Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986), described infra Appendix.
21 Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965) reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e (1988). The implementing regulations for Executive Order 11,246 are found at 41
C.F.R. § 60-2 (1990). See generally 2 CHARLES A, SULLIVAN, MICHAEL J. LIMMER Sc RICHARD
F. RICHARDS, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 547-60 (2d ed. 1988), discussing Executive Order
I I,246's contents, enforcement and validity.
910	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 33:903
crimination in employment, housing and voting. 22
 The Court ac-
celerated the momentum by issuing decisions broadly interpreting
the rights recently created by Congress."
Initially, the nation's struggle to open the political and economic
infrastructure, to include racial minorities in "We, the people,"
focused on the removal of barriers to participation, or in other
words, equal access. For example, in 1964, when Congress and the
President first joined together to put the strength of the national
government behind the Civil Rights movement, it was generally
believed that with the outlawing of deliberate racism in employ-
ment, minorities would have access to blue-collar, white-collar and
professional jobs. Congress's overriding concern was to prohibit
disparate treatment, i.e., intentional discrimination. 24 It soon be-
came apparent, however, that many employment practices that elim-
inated minorities from hiring and promotion opportunities at a rate
much greater than whites were neutral on their face and adopted
without apparent discriminatory motive. 25
Responding to this awareness, the Court fashioned the "dis-
parate impact" theory of liability under Title VII. 26 That theory
required employers to eliminate neutral barriers that were not
22
 Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C, §§ 2000e-5(c)-2000e-17 (1988)); Fair Housing Act of 1968,
Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. $§ 3601.4631 (1988));
Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 1/§ 801-809, 82 Stat. 73 (1968); Voting Rights
Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, §§ 1973 et seq., 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 et seq. (1988)); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1447; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-1975d, 2000a-2000h-
6 (1988)).
" E.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey,
430 U.S. 144 (1977); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424 (1971); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); Newman v. Piggie Park
Enters., 390 U.S. 400 (1968); Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964); Heart of
Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
24 Drew S. Days III, The Court's Response to the Reagan Civil Rights Agenda, 42 VAND. L.
REV. 1003, 1003-07 (1989).
26
 Congress specifically evidenced this new awareness in the 1972 amendments to Title
VII. S. REP. No. 1137, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1970). See also S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. 5 (1971).
26
 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See generally BARBARA L. SCHLEI &
PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw 1286-394 (2d ed. 1983); Mary C. Daly,
Some Runs, Same Hits, Some Errors—Keeping Score in the Affirmative Action Ballpark from Weber
to Johnson, 30 B.C. L. REV. 1, 10-12 (1988). For a considered and comprehensive study of
the disparate treatment and disparate impact theories of Title VII liability, see Theodore Y.
Blumoff & Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Reagan Court and Title VII: A Common-Law Outlook on a
Statutory Task, 69 N.C. L. REV. I (1990).
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clearly "business-related." Congress, in amending the 1964 Equal
Employment Opportunity Act in 1972, approved the Court's ex-
pansive definition of proscribed forms of discrimination.
The 1972 amendments also extended Title V1I's prohibitions
to state and municipal governments: 27 Until the 1972 amendments,
public sector employees could seek redress for racial discrimination
in employment only by invoking the protection of the Fourteenth
Amendment. To establish a Fourteenth Amendment violation, how-
ever, they had to prove intentional discrimination. The 1972
amendments enormously benefited the victims of discrimination by
relieving them of the responsibility of proving intent." Public sector
employees alleging discriminatory hiring and promotion policies
bore a significantly reduced burden of proof under the disparate
impact theory of liability. 29
The legislative history of the 1972 amendments suggests, more-
over, that Congress approved the race-conscious regulations im-
posed on federal contractors by Executive Order 11,246." These
regulations required federal contractors to adopt goals and time-
tables to insure the greater participation of minorities in their work-
force. 31
Executive Order 11,246 and the disparate impact test also re-
flected a subtle but powerful shift in the philosophical underpinning
of affirmative action. Courts and executive agencies increasingly
measured discrimination in terms of "groups," not "individuals." 32
The government and private attorneys general spent considerable
energy ferreting out institutional structures that blocked minority
27 Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 104-05
(1972) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-5(c), 2000e-16 (1982)). George P. Sape & Thomas J.
Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 824, 847-49 (1972).
2B Congress described relief under the Fourteenth Amendment as "an empty promise
... [for] disadvantaged individuals." H.R. REP. No. 92-238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in
1972 U.S.C.C.A,N. 2137, 2153-54.
su SCHLE1 & GROSSMAN, supra note 26, at 1186.
3° While Congress was considering the 1972 amendments, two courts in highly publicized
cases rejected statutory and constitutional challenges to Executive Order 11,246. United
States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971);
Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854
(1971). During the Congressional debate, Senator Ervin introduced two separate amendments
to overturn these decisions. Both amendments were overwhelmingly rejected. 118 CONG.
REC. 1676, 4917-18 (1972).
3 C.F.R. § 340 (1965), reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982). See generally
Roy L. Brooks, Affirmative Action in Law Teaching, 14 CoLum. Hum. RTS. L. REV. 15, 19, 22
(1982).
32 Days, supra note 24, at 1004-05.
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access to better job and career opportunities." Enforcement em-
phasis shifted from "perpetrators" (those with evil intent) to "vic-
tims" (minority group members disadvantaged by institutional bar-
riers as much as, if not more than, by deliberate racism).
Accompanying this shift was a corresponding shift in remedies.
Comparatively little energy was invested in punishing perpetrators.
The goal was elimination of the offending barriers. The success of
these efforts was measured by the percentage increases in the em-
ployment of, promotion of, or contracting with, minority group
members.
The Court's momentum has slowed considerably in the last
several years. Indeed, many, students of the Court point to Metro
Broadcasting and other recent decisions as proof that the momentum
is now moving in the opposite direction, making it more difficult for
civil rights complainants to have their day in court. 34 Organizations
representing racial minorities are increasingly looking to Congress
to take the lead in eradicating the still too persistent vestiges of
second-class citizenship from which minorities suffer."
"E.g., height and weight requirements (Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977));
aptitude tests (Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975)); high school diploma
requirement (Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)). The disparate impact theory
applies to subjective criteria used in making hiring and promotion decisions as well as to
objective criteria. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 988 (1988).
34
 The author argued precisely this point in Mary C. Daly, Affirmative Action, Equal Access,
and the Supreme Court's 1988 Term: The Rehnquist Court Takes a Sharp Turn to the Right, 18
HOESTRA L. Rev. 1057, 1060, 1067-68, 1127 (1990). See also generally Douglas D. Scherer,
Affirmative Action Doctrine and the Conflicting Message of Croson, 38 RAN. L. REV. 281, 281-82,
285, 340 (1990). Two stimulating articles with more abstract frameworks that reach the same
conclusion are: Alan Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: The View from 1989, 64 TUL. L. REV.
1407, 1407-08, 1433, 1441 (1990); D. Marvin Jones, Unrighlable Wrongs: The Rehnquist Court,
Civil Rights and an Elegy for Dreams, 25 U.S.F. L. Rev. 1, 2-3, 44-48, 65-66 (1990).
The Court's shift was undoubtedly hastened by the insistence of the Justice Department
in the Reagan Administration on an "intent" standard of proof and liability. Compare William
B. Reynolds, The Reagan Administration and Civil Rights: Winning the War Against Discrimination,
1986 U. ILL. L. REv. 1001 with Joel L. Selig, The Reagan Justice Department and Civil Rights:
What Went Wrong, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 785. For further commentary, see Drew S. Days III,
Turning Rath the Clock: The Reagan Administration and Civil Rights, 19 HARV. C.R.•C.L. L. Rev.
309 (1984); Joel L. Selig, The Reagan Administration and Civil Rights: Professor Selig Responds to
Assistant Attorney General Reynolds, 1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 431.
35 Congress has not hesitated in the past to intervene when it disagreed with the Court's
statutory interpretation of civil rights legislation. E.g., Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987,
Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d) (overturning Grove City
College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984)); Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, Pub.
L. No. 99-372, 100 Stat. 796 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(B)—(G)) (overturning Smith v.
Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984)); 1986 Amendments to the Rehabilitation Act, Pub. L. No.
99-506, 100 Stat. 1807 (codified at 29 U.S.C. 701) (overturning Atascadero State Hospital
v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985)); Pregnancy Discrimination Act of Oct. 31, 1978, Pub. L.
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Before the momentum ended, however, significant structural
changes occurred within the public and private sectors. Fearful of
statutory and/or constitutional liability, worried about employee div-
isiveness caused by litigation, and apprehensive of the misdirection
of valuable executive time, many employers voluntarily instituted
"affirmative action"s" programs to increase the number of minorities
No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 2000e(k)) (overturning General Elec. Co.
v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976)); Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
559, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988) (overturning Alyeska Pipeline Service Co.
v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975)). See generally Charles S. Ralston, Court vs. Congress:
Jrulicial Interpretation of the Civil Rights Arts and Congressional Response, 8 YALE L. & POL. REV.
205 (1990).
The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) overturns in
whole or in part eight Supreme Court decisions handed down between 1987 and 1991:
Wards Cove Packing Co. v, Aionio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (1 105); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Del.
Co., I l 1 S. Ct. 1227 (1991) (I 109); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)
(1 107); Loratice v. AT&T Technologies, 490 U.S. 900 (1989) (1 112); Martin v. Wilkes, 490
U.S. 754 (1989) (I 108); Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437 (1987)
(1 113); Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310 (1986) (1 114); Patterson v. McLean
Credit. Union, 490 U.S. 164 (1989) (1 101). For a detailed discussion of Congress's dissatis-
faction with these cases, see H.R. REP. No. 102-40(1), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-164 (1991),
reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549-693 (1991); H.R. REA No. 102-40(11), 102d Cong., 1st
Sess., 1-81 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694-767 (1991). The impact of these cases
is discussed in Alfred W. Blumrosen, The 1989 Supreme Court Rulings Concerning Employment
Discrimination and Affirmative Action: A Minefield for Employers and a Goldmine for Their Lawyers,
15 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 175 (1989).
3" Both the legislative and executive branches have used the term "affirmative action" in
positive law. Section 706(g) of Title Vii provides: "If the court finds that the respondent has
intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice .
the court may ... order such affirmative action as may he appropriate. . .." Executive Order
11,246 imposes an "affirmative action" obligation on government contractors. See infra notes
55-59 and accompanying text. The term was first used by President Kennedy in Executive
Order 10,925, a predecessor to Executive Order 11,246. See generally James E. Jones, jr., The
Origins of Affirmative Action, 2i -1..1.C. DAvis L. REV. 383 (1988).
Unless the context clearly indicates the contrary, "affirmative action" in this article refers
to voluntary race-conscious preferences, i.e., preferences adopted by choice after indepen-
dent decision making, and not in response to either litigation or administrative or judicial
mandate. Affirmative action, however, can have a much broader meaning and is often
employed to describe a wide range of activities fashioned "to overcome the effects of past or
present practices, policies or other harriers to equal employment opportunity." EEOC Guide-
lines on Affirmative Action Appropriate Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
amended by 29 C.F.R. § 1608.1(c) (1990). Used in this manner, affirmative action encompasses
recruiting activities, training programs, elimination of any adverse impact caused by selection
criteria not validated pursuant to EEOC Guidelines and modification of promotion and layoff
procedures. Id.; see also Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP), Affir-
mative Action Programs, 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.1-2.32 (1990). This article addresses voluntary
race-conscious preferences. The Court has approved the use of judicially mandated prefer-
ences where the defendant-employer's conduct has been particularly egregious. E.g., United
States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987); Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S.
421 (1986). The rationale for such remedies is fairly obvious. Without them, "victims would
remain uncompensated, wrongdoers would stand uncorrected, and third persons would
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in their workforce and to raise the number of minorities holding
non-menial positions within their organizations' structures. 37 Public
contracting authorities adopted set-aside programs to encourage
the participation of minority businesses in public works construc-
tion." The critical provision in both types of plans was the one that
identified the plan's quotas or goals 39 for minority participation
(e.g., 50 percent minority enrollment in a training program, or 10
percent minority business enterprise participation in public works
contracts). Critics denounced such race-conscious programs as "re-
verse discrimination," because the programs conferred benefits on
minorities who were not personally victims of discrimination by an
employer or contracting authority. They also condemned the pro-
grams' adoption in the absence of findings of discrimination by an
administrative, legislative or judidial body. Supporters of affirmative
action programs, however, disputed the statutory and constitutional
significance of the critics' charges, arguing that "equal access,"—the
removal of barriers—was an incomplete remedy. They championed
instead "equal achievement," in which membership in a traditionally
excluded racial group would be counted as a legitimate cipher in
an employer's calculus of hiring and promotion or a public con-
tracting official's calculus of bid letting.
In philosophical and jurisprudential circles, the debate between
equal access and equal achievement continues unabated. The con-
tributions of the Supreme Court to the debate have been marginal.
Like society at large, the Court has been divided over the use of
race in employment and contracting decisions. Study of the Court's
unintentionally reap the unearned benefits of discrimination as a form of unjust enrichment"
Burt Neuborne, Notes for the Restatement (First) of the Law of Affirmative Action: An Essay in
Honor of Judge John Minor Wisdom, 64 Tut.. L. REV., 1543, 1546-47 (1990).
" As Professor Cox has observed:
Employers and Unions are not formally subject to liability for failure to achieve
balanced work forces, but they incur substantial risks of liability and costs of
defense both in utilizing selection criteria correlated with race or gender and
in having imbalanced work forces. They may, moreover, minimize these risks
through conscious and formal efforts to achieve race and gender balance.
Employers, therefore, haVe an incentive both to adopt affirmative action as an
operating policy and to defend it so long as the incentive structure generated
by Title VII theories of liability remains in place. To suggest that affirmative
action is not required by this judicially created incentive structure is to engage
•in "newspeak."
Paul N. Cox, The Supreme Court, Tide VII and "Voluntary" Affirmative Action—A Critique, 21
IND. L. REV. 768, 806 (1988).
" See infra notes 76-125 and accompanying text for a detailed description of these
programs.
" For a discussion of goals and quotas, see infra note 47.
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eleven affirmative action cases shows the decisions to be roughly
equally divided between the two concepts. 4°
B. The Equal AccesslEqual Achievement Debate
Two competing concepts of equality have drawn the attention
of philosophers and legal scholars in connection with the use of
race-conscious preferences in the public and private sectors: equal
access and equal achievement. 4 ' The easiest way to understand the
.1 ° For a description of each of these cases and their relationship to the equal access/equal
achievement construct, see infra Appendix. An earlier version of this chart appeared in Daly,
supra note 34, at 1128-31.
For the purposes of this article, no distinction is made with respect to the substantive
norm under which the cases arose (i.e., Title VII, the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment or the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment). The same issues and principles surround race-conscious preferences
by employers and contracting authorities in both the public and private sectors, regardless
of the statutory or constitutional underpinning. The Court treats these cases as forging one
body of law, freely incorporating doctrine and precedent from one line of cases into the
others. See Neuborne, supra note 36, at 1543-44.
4 ' This discussion makes no attempt to describe comprehensively the principles animating
the equal access/equal achievement debate. Its purpose is to provide a framework for the
subsequent analysis of the Court's standard-of-review jurisprudence. To capture the vigor of
the debate in contemporary political terms, compare William B. Reynolds, An Equal Oppor-
tunity Scorecard, 21 GA. L. REV. 1007 (1987) (equal access); Peter Westen, The Concept of Equal
Opportunity, 95 ETHICS 837 (1985) (same) with Alan Freeman, Racism, Rights and the Quest for
Equality of Opportunity: A Critical Legal Essay, 23 HARV, C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 295 (1988) (equal
achievement); Benjamin L. Hooks, Affirmative Action: A Needed Remedy, 21 GA. L. REV. 1043
(1987) (same); Michael Rosenfeld, Substantive Equality and Equal Opportunity: A Jurisprudential
Appraisal, 74 CAL. L. REv. 1687 (1986) (same). Additional resources are cited infra notes 44-
45, 49, 51-53, 82, 84. Extended bibliographies can be found in ROBERT K. FULLINWIDER,
THE REVERSE DISCRIMINATION CONTROVERSY: A MORAL AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 277-91 (1980);
KATHANNE W. GREENE, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE 177-81 (1989).
The equal access/equal achievement debate in many ways mirrors the individual rights/
group rights debate.
On the one hand, there is the plea from many blacks for reparations in the
form of substantial approximation to ethnic proportionality in the allocation of
scarce social goods. . On the other hand, a policy of ethnic proportionality
that qualifies a person's equality of opportunity has no foundation in our
individual-rights focused constitutional tradition; [and] no foundation in the
traditional western concept of equal citizenship, a status keyed to personality
and not to groups.. ..
Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Bakke: A Constitutional Analysis, 67 CAL. L. REV. 69, 74 (1979). See
generally Frank Askin, Eliminating Racial Inequality in a Racist World, 1975 Civ. LIB. REV. 96;
Ronald Ellis, Victim-Specific Remedies: A Myopic Approach to Discrimination, 13 N.Y.C. REV. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 575 (1984-85); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Paul C. Weiler, Firefighters v. Stotts:
Conflicting ModeLs of Racial justice, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 1; Robert A. Sedler, Racial Preference
and the Constitution: The Societal Interest in the Equal Participation Objective, 26 WAYNE L. REV.
1227 (1980). With the exception of Lamprecht v. FCC, 958 F.2d 382 (D.C. Cir. 1992),
discussed infra note 118, Justice Thomas's views on group-based preferences are not specif-
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difference between them is through President Lyndon Johnson's
metaphor of the road race:
Imagine a hundred-yard dash in which one of the two
runners has his legs shackled together. He has progressed
10 yards, while the unshackled runner has gone 50 yards.
How do they rectify the situation? Do they merely remove
the shackles and allow the race to proceed? Then they
could say that "equal opportunity" now prevailed. But one
of the runners would still be forty yards ahead of the
other. Would it not be the better part of justice to allow
the previously shackled runner to make-up the forty yard
gap; or to start the race all over again? That would be
affirmative action towards equality. 42
As this metaphor illustrates, the core value at the heart of the equal
access construct is the level playing field. Equal access proponents
argue that the public and private sectors' responsibility stops with
the removal of barriers blocking entry to employment, entrepre-
neurial opportunities, housing and education. Their rallying cry is
Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson: "Our Constitution is
color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among
citizens. . . . The law regards man as man, and takes no account of
his surroundings or of his color. . . ."43
 Championing Harlan's
"color-blind" approach, proponents acknowledge that treating in-
dividuals differently because of an immutable characteristic such as
race, color, national origin or gender is morally wrong and should
be legally outlawed. Because these traits are beyond the individual's
control, their presence or absence should not be the basis for the
dispensing or withholding of government benefits. Surveying the
vast power and resources held by non-public institutions, some
equal access proponents take this conclusion a step further. They
ically known. His hostility can reasonably be inferred, however, from statements and policy
decisions he made as Chair of the EEOC. Under his leadership, the number of class-action
"pattern or practice" lawsuits declined significantly and the agency shifted its enforcement
efforts to cases alleging individual instances of discrimination. GREENE, supra note 41, at 5.
For a general discussion of Justice Thomas's stewardship at the EEOC, see Juan Williams, A
Question of Fairness, ATLANTIC, Feb. 1987, at 71. See also Oversight Hearings on EEOC's Proposed
Modification of Enforcement Regulations, Including Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Pro-
cedures, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 63 (1985).
92 FULLINWIDER, supra note 40, at 94-95.
" Plessy v. Ferguson, 163. U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). There is more
than a little irony in celebrating Harlan's "color-blind" approach. Right before this oft-quoted
phrase Harlan pays tribute to the white race, "the dominant race . . . in prestige, in achieve-
ments, in education, in wealth and in power." Id. at 559.
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demand that the government impose similar constraints on certain
types of private transactions, such as decisions relating to employ-
ment, entrepreneurial opportunities, housing, etc:" In their view,
government abdicates its responsibility to the body politic when it
permits private sector decisionmakers to foreclose economic ad-
vancement because of' traits over which the individual has no control
and which, from an objective viewpoint, bear no relationship to the
intrinsic character of the private transaction. 45
While staunchly supporting the removal of barriers, equal ac-
cess proponents draw the line at accelerating the entry of previously
excluded groups through the use of devices such as the race norm-
ing of test scores4" or quotas:17 Professor Bickel's denunciation oc-
cupies a prominent place in their opposition to quotas:
4.1 lint see NATHAN GLAZER, AFFIRMATIVE DISCRIMINATION: ETHNIC INEQUALITY AND PUB-
LIC; POLICY xii—xiii (arguing against the "active involvement of government ... in employment
and education"). See generally William A. Galston, Equal Opportunity and Liberal Theory, in
JUSTICE AND EquALrry HERE AND Now 89-107 (Frank Lucas]] ed., 1986).
45
 See bun RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 275 (1971) (endorsing a social system in which
government "enforces and underwrites equality of opportunity in economic activities and in
the free choice of occupation. This is achieved by policing the conduct of firms and private
associations... .").
4" The question of race norming became a political hot potato in the Bush Administra-
tion. The National Academy of Sciences examined the validity of the Department of Labor's
General Aptitude Test routinely used by federal and state employment agencies to measure
competence and physical agility in a number of spheres. Officials of the Reagan Administra-
tion had encouraged the test users to adjust the scores of Black and Hispanic applicants to
lessen the impact of their generally lower scores. The National Academy of Sciences study
concluded that the test was only "moderately useful" in predicting job success and urged that
the race norming be continued. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, FAIRNESS IN EMPLOYMENT
TESTING: VALIDITY GENERALIZATION, MINORITY ISSUES, AND THE GENERAL APTITUDE TEST
BATTERY ( John A. Hartigan & Alexandra K. Wigdor eds., 1989). But see Jan H. Blits & Linda
S. Gottfredson, Employment Testing and Job Performance, 98 •Puss. lx-rEitEsT 18 (1990). The
Bush Administration considered ordering the suspension of the test instead. Peter T. Kilborn,
Race Norming' Tests Becomes A Fiery Issue, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1991, at 4, 5. See also Civil
Rights Bill Alters Fairness of '64 Law; Test Profits Blacks, N.Y. TIMES, June I I, 1991, at A22.
Ultimately, the controversy was resolved with the passage of section 106 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, Stat. 1071 (1991), which made it "an unlawful
employment practice ... to adjust the scores of, use different cutoff scores for, or otherwise
alter the results of, employment related tests on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin."
47 In affirmative action vernacular, "quota" carries within its definition the notion of an
absolute number that must be attained. In contrast, "goal" carries within its definition the
notion of flexibility, a standard toward which an employer or contracting official is striving
but need not necessarily satisfy. In condemning quotas, most equal access proponents deny
any meaningful distinction between quotas and goals. They argue that employers and con-
tracting officials transform goals into quotas by imposing penalties for failures to achieve the
designated goals. See Cox, supra note 37, at 842. This criticism does not appear to be merited,
however. See infra note'281 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has not meaningfully
distinguished between the two terms. E.g., Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616,
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[A] racial quota derogates the human dignity and individ-
uality of all to whom it is applied; it is invidious in principle
as well as in practice. Moreover, it can as easily be turned
against those it purports to help. The history of the racial
quota is a history of subjugation, not beneficence. Its evil
lies not in its name, but in its effect; a quota is a divider
of society, a creator of castes, and it is all the worse for its
racial base, especially in a society desperately striving for
an equality that will make race irrelevant."
Proponents of the equal achievement construct, on the other
hand, maintain that the removal of barriers is not sufficient to
overcome two hundred years of slavery and more than one hundred
years of economic and educational oppression:19
 Where others see
635-36 (1987); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 938 U.S. 265, 288-89 n.26 (1978). In
Johnson, the Court relied on its decision in Weber, a quota case, in rejecting a Title VII
challenge to the goals and timetables in an affirmative action plan.
Equal access proponents also argue that quotas and goals inevitably lead to the selection
of minimally qualified candidates of the preferred race over better-qualified candidates of
the non-preferred race. Justice Scalia has forcefully argued this point. In a law review article
that achieved a degree of notoriety during his confirmation proceedings, he wrote:
Unfortunately, the world of employment applicants does not divide itself merely
into "qualified" and "unqualified" individuals. There is a whole range of ability—
from unqualified, through minimally qualified, qualified, well qualified, to out-
standing. If I can't get Leontyne Price to sing a concert I have scheduled, I may
have to settle for Erma Glatt. La Glatt has a pretty good voice, but not as goad
as Price. Is she unqualified? Not really—she has sung other concerts with modest
success. But she is just not as good as Price. Any system that coerces me to hire
her in preference to Price, because of her race, degrades the quality of my
product and discriminates on racial grounds against Price. And it is no answer
to either of' these charges that Glatt is "qualified." To seek to assuage either the
employer's demand for quality or the disfavored applicant's demand for equal
treatment by saying there is no need to have any unqualified individuals is a
sort of intellectual shell game which diverts attention from the major issue by
firmly responding to a minor one.
Antonin Scalia, THE DISEASE AS CURE: "In order to get beyond racism we must take account of
race.", 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 147. 149.
48
 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 133 (1975). See also generally
Richard A. Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment of Racial
Minorities, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. I, 15-19, 24-25.
49 E.g., LESTER C. THUROW, THE ZERO SUM SOCIETY 187-89 (1980) (rejecting the equal
access construct on the ground that it fails to acknowledge the practical implications of years
of discrimination); Morton J. Horwitz, The Jurisprudence of Brown and the Dilemmas of Liber-
alism, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L, REV. 599, 608 (1979) (arguing that the acknowledgment of
group rights is an essential predicate to remedying discrimination's lingering effects); Randall
Kennedy, Persuasiois and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative Action Debate, 99 HARV. L. REV.
1327, 1328 (1986) (calling the use of race-conscious plans a powerful vehicle for "overcoming
entrenched racial hierarchy"); Charles B. Renfrew, Affirmative Action: A Plea for a Rectification
Principle, 9 Sw. U. L. REV. 597, 609 (1977) (applauding the use of the equal achievement
construct to distribute social advantages as they might have been distributed in the absence
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a level playing field, they see a ladder." Taking dead aim at Justice
Harlan's cry for a color-blind society, they counter with Justice
Blackmun's admonition: "In order to get beyond racism, we must
first take account of race. . .. [I]n order to treat some persons
equally, we must treat them differently."5 ' They dispute Professor
Bickel's characterization of race-conscious quotas as "a divider of
society, a creator of castes." Equal achievement proponents rally
around Professor Ely:
Whites are not going to discriminate against all whites for
reasons of racial prejudice, and neither will they be
tempted generally to underestimate the needs and deserts
of whites relative to those, say, of blacks or to overestimate
costs of devising a more finely tuned classification system
that would extend to certain whites the advantages they
are extending to blacks. 52
The equal access/equal achievement, Harlan/Blackmun, Bickel/
Ely debate continues on without resolution in academia" and at the
national level of political discourse. 54
 While the Court has ended
of lingering de jure racial prejudice); Michael Rosenfeld, Decoding Richmond: Affirmative Action
and the Elusive Meaning of Constitutional Equality, 87 M ICH. L. REV. 1729, 1794 (1989) (criticizing
the Court's adoption of the strict scrutiny test as "simplistic" and calling for "a vision of
constitutional equality that draws explicitly on substantive values"; Thomas Ross, The Rich-
mond Narratives, 68 TEX. L. REV. 381, 598, 406, 408, 413 (1989) (arguing that to adopt the
equal access construct is to ignore the years of advantage enjoyed by whites at the expense
of minorities).
" Courtland Cox, former director of the Minority Business Opportunity Commission
and a champion of minority business set-asides, has observed, "[Of we had a level playing
field, 1 would not object to ending such programs, . . . But 1Bilacks and minority businesses
don't have a level playing field. They have a ladder." Lewis, supra note 6, at A22.
51 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978).
52 JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 170 (1980). In a similar vein, Professor Brooks
has opined:
Affirmative action is a means (formed from nonconsensual relations) by which
white males as a group can share their power, wealth, and opportunities with
minorities and females in an equitable manner. When white male power-brokers
decide to give minorities and females a bigger . . . piece of the American pie,
that can hardly be called "reverse discrimination"—it can only be called sharing.
Roy L. Brooks, The Affirmative Action Issue: Law, Policy, and Morality, 22 CONN. L. REV. 323,
352 (1990).
" E.g., RONALD M. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 223-39 (1977); FULLINWIDER,
supra note 40, at 93-109 (1980); GLAZER, supra note 44, at vii–xxv; Owen M. Fiss, A Theory
of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 236-49 (1971). See also generally Michael
Rosenfeld, supra note 41.
" Witness much of the debate over the proposed Civil Rights Act of 1990 and the
President's veto based on the White House's assertion that the bill would compel employers
to adopt quotas as a matter of practical necessity. See infra note 296.
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the debate in constitutional terms, its feeble resolution betrays com-
mon sense and hobbles state and local initiatives designed to over-
come the legacy of slavery and segregation. In City of Richmond,
discussed below, the Court put its constitutional imprimatur on the
equal access construct by subjecting state and local government race-
conscious preferences to the strict scrutiny standard of review. Ap-
plication of that standard inevitably leads to invalidation. In Metro
Broadcasting, the Court adopted the less rigorous intermediate test,
acknowledging Congress's power to employ the equal achievement
construct in enacting legislation designed to overcome the decades
of political, social and economic exclusion suffered by minorities.
Bifurcating the power of government to deal with the intract-
able problems of racially inspired economic apartheid makes no
sense. The Court lamely resorted to historical events distinctly at
odds with the contemporary use of racial preferences to justify the
bifurcation: because the states (apparently unlike the national gov-
ernment) once used race to deny minorities political, social and
economic rights, their use of race to benefit minorities was too
suspect to justify any review less stringent than strict scrutiny.''
C. Equal Achievement: The Preferred Construct in the Marketplace
While philosophers, law professors and Supreme Court justices
have been debating the meaning of equality, public and private
employers and contracting authorities have bypassed the debate and
implemented race-conscious preferences across the nation and in
every segment of the economy: manufacturing, services and profes-
sions. As a recent. New York Times headline phrased it, "Affirmative
Action Plans Are Now Part of The Normal Corporate Way of
Life." 5I' The Department of Labor estimates that affirmative action
plans cover more than 30 million private sector employees who
work in 95,000 different companies that hold contracts with federal
agencies for over $184 billion.'? Government agencies at the federal,
55
 City of Richmond, 488 U.S. at 490-92. While a majority of the Justices did not join in
Part 11 of justice O'Connor's opinion detailing this rationale, they did not voice significant
opposition to it. indeed, the rationale appears to have won the endorsement of a majority
of the Justices in Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3008-09.
56 Steven A. Holmes, Affirmative Action Plans Are Now Part of the Normal Corporate Way of
Life, N.Y. TtstEs, Nov. 22, 1991, at A20.
57 HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. AND LABOR, A REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATIONS ON THE CIVIL
Rtotrrs ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES OF THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL CONTRACT COMPLIANCE PRO-
GRAMS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2. See also Holmes, supra note 56, at
A20. See infra notes 62-66 and accompanying text for a discussion of Executive Order
11,246.
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state and municipal level have implemented affirmative action plans
in greater numbers." A survey of major federal contractors re-
vealed:
Most corporate executives see affirmative action as an es-
sential management tool that reinforces accountability and
maximizes the utilization of the talents of their entire
workforce. None see 'goals and timetables' elements in
their affirmative action plans as requiring the use of quo-
tas. Without exception those interviewed were opposed to
quotas on the basis of sex or race. 59
Ironically, American businesses recognized the need for an
integrated workforce at precisely the same time the Supreme Court
turned its back on affirmative action. When the Reagan Adminis-
tration proposed eliminating the numerical goals and timetables
mandated by Executive Order 11,246 and sought to reopen prom-
inent goal-based consent decrees entered into by prior Administra-
tions,"° the vigorous opposition of private sector employers caught
the Administration completely by surprise.'''
Government contractors, based on years of experience imple-
menting Executive Ordei- 11,246,62 championed the cause of goals
58 For a comprehensive 50-state survey, see Daly, supra note 41, at 1074 n.72.
59 See generally J. FE111), AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: A FRESH LOOK AT Tip: RECORD Twi,srry-
Two YEARS AFTER THE BEGINNING (1984).
61} Based on the Court's decision in Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S.
561 (1984) (see infra Appendix), the Reagan Administration argued that voluntary goals and
timetables violated Title VII, See Racial Quotas Hurl Blacks and Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
9, 1985, at A22; Kenneth B. Noble, Labor Dep't Aides Rebut Meese View, N.Y. Timm, Nov. 29,
1985, at A28; Robert Pear, Rights Chief Assails Hiring G6als As Failure, N.Y. -rims, Nov. 1,
1985, at Al9; Joe Davidson & Linda Watkins, Jobs Debate, WALL Sr. J., Oct. 24, 1985, at 1;
Joann S. Lublin & Andy Pasztur, White House Softens Its Draft Proposal to Lift Jobs-Bias Rules
for Contractors, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 1985, at 10. See also Days, supra note 24. The Reagan
Administration abandoned these efforts after the Court decided Johnson v. Tratisportation
Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) and United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987). See infra
Appendix. Administration officials were highly critical of both decisions. Stuart Taylor, Jr.,
Supreme Court Reaffirms Rejection of a Reagan Tenet, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1987, § 4 (The Week
in Review), at I; Robert Pear, Rights Panel Assails High Court Sanctioning Job Preferences, N.Y.
'TIMES, May 14, 1987, at A l.
" See Nathan Glazer, The Affirmative Action Stalemate, 90 Putt. INTEREST 99, 105-06 (1988);
see generally BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION TODAY 101-43 (1986) (describing
the broad-based support in the business community for race/gender-conscious preferences).
n The success of Executive Order 11,246 in accelerating minority entry into previously
all-white jobs is well documented. E.g., HERBERT HAMMERMAN, A DECADE OF NEW OPPOR-
TuNiTY: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN THE 1970s 42-44 (The Potomac Institute, 1984). Equal
Opportunity, Nat'l Bureau of Economic Research, 47 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 1092 ( June 15,
1987). See also Virginia du Rivage, The OFCCP Under the Reagan Administration: Affirmative
Action in Retreat, 36 LAB. L.J. 360, 363 (1985); Alan Freeman, Black Economic Progress After
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and timetables, describing them as highly effective tools for assuring
racial and gender equality in the workplace. 63 Strong support for
numerical goals and timetables, moreover, came from private sector
employers who were not government contractors subject to Exec-
utive Order 11,246." Their companies had voluntarily incorporated
race/gender-conscious preferences into personnel decisions. The
experience of these employers pointed to the usefulness of numer-
ical goals and timetables in opening previously closed career op-
portunities to minorities and women. The National Association of
Manufacturers described affirmative action as "good business pol-
icy."h5
 Surveys showed that even if the Reagan Administration had
succeeded in dissolving the numerical goals and timetables of Ex-
ecutive Order 11,246, private sector employers would not have
abandoned them until such time as their illegality was conclusively
established. 66
The strong support of the business community represents an
amazing about-face. In the early days of Executive Order 11,246
and Title VII, the federal government argued that numerical goals
and timetables made business sense; employers disagreed. In the
1980s, the business community vigorously defended the use of nu-
merical goals and timetables; the federal government protested. 67
Just as race/gender-conscious plans are now tightly woven into the
fabric of public and private employment, they are also a fixture in
public contracting. In 1989, it was estimated that 250 states and
municipalities had enacted minority business set-aside programs to
the benefit of 60,000 minority/women owned firms. 68
1964: Who Has Gained and Why?, in STUDIES IN LABOR MARKETS (Sherwin Rosen ed., 1981);
James J. Heckman & J. Hoult Verkerke, Racial Disparity and Employment Discrimination Law:
An Economic Perspective, 8 YALE L. & POLY REV. 276, 290-91, 297 (1990); Richard T. Seymour,
Why Executive Order 11246 Should Be Preserved, 1 1 EMPLOYEE REL. L. J. 568, 572 (1985). Race-
conscious preferences have particularly benefited minorities at the upper end of the skills
and education continuums. James P. Smith & Finis Welch, Affirmative Action and Labor Markets,
2 J. LAB. ECON. 269 (1984).
" See Daniel Seligman, Affirmative Action Is Here to Stay, FORTUNE, Apr. 19, 1982, at 143,
160.
" See BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, supra note 61, at 92; Colin Leinster, Black Executives:
How They're Doing, FORTUNE, Jan. 18, 1988, at 109, 114.
65 Anne B. Fisher, Businessmen Like to Hire by the Numbers, FORTUNE, Sept. 16, 1985, at 26,
28-30. See also Peter C. Robertson, Why Bosses Like to Be Told to Hire Minorities, WASH. POST.,
Nov. 10, 1985, at DI.
" See BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, supra note 61, at 89, 92-93.
°See Seligman, supra note 63, at 162.
&I U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 6, 1989, at 13. A comprehensive listing of local and
state-sponsored MBE programs can be found in Drew S. Days III, Fullilove, 96 YALE L.J.
453, 454-55 n.10 (1987). See also Brief of the National League of Cities et al as Amici Curiae
September 1992]	 AFFIRMATIVE ACTION	 923
II. How THE COURT'S SELECTION OF THE STANDARD OF REVIEW IN
GOVERNMENT ACTION CASES REFLECTS ITS VACILLATION BETWEEN
THE EQUAL ACCESS/EQUAL ACHIEVEMENT CONSTRUCTS
A. The Standard of Review
There are many frayed threads in the fabric of the Court's
affirmative action jurisprudence. Among the most worn is the ques-
tion of which standard of review should be applied to government
decisions benefiting minorities as opposed to disadvantaging them.
Over the course of the past fifty years or so, the Court has developed
a three-tiered, standard of review to test the constitutionality of
government classifications against the equal protection guarantees
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. At the lowest rung is the
rational basis test, by which the Court judges economic and social
welfare legislation, rules and practices. Its bite is minimal because
the government must demonstrate only that the challenged conduct
has a legitimate basis and that the means are rationally related to
that purpose.69 More rigorous than the rational basis test is the
intermediate test, which requires the government to demonstrate
an important purpose and that the means are substantially related
to that purpose. The Court has applied the intermediate test to
government action that distinguishes among individuals based on
their gender, their status as non-citizens, and the marital status of
their parents."
The strict scrutiny test occupies the highest rung of the three
tiers. The government must demonstrate a compelling state interest
and adopt means narrowly tailored to effect that end. Because the
strict scrutiny theory is inevitably "strict in theory and fatal in fact," 7
the Court, until City of Richmond, had reserved its application to
government action that disadvantaged individuals based on their
race and national origin. 72
in Support of Appellant at 1-2, City of Richmond v. 	 Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989)
(No. 87-998).
6° E.g., Bankers Life Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71 (1988); Bowen v. Owens,
476 U.S. 340 (1986); Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985). See generally
United States v. Caroline Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
7° E.g., Clark v. Deter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988) (illegitimacy); Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1
(1983) (same); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (gender); Phlyer
v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (alienage); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982) (illegitimacy);
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (gender).
Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Ham L. REV. I, 8 (1972).
" E.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11
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Strict scrutiny's fatal effect left the Court in a quandary when
the first race-conscious plans reached its docket. Ultimately, the
Court splintered into two camps: those who espoused Justice Har-
lan's credo of a color-blind Constitution's and those who believed
with Justice Blackmun that, "[i]n order to get beyond racism, we
must first take account of race . . . in order to treat some persons
equally, we must first treat them differently."74
 The first camp de-
fined equality solely in terms of the equal access construct; the
second, in terms of the equal achievement construct. Neither camp
could consistently muster majority support because Justices O'Con-
nor, Stevens and White recognized the constitutional virtues and
vices in both definitions. Their votes were unpredictable and incon-
sistent:75
 The result is an unseemly bifurcation of governmental
power.
B. The Cases: An Overview
Three lines of inquiry dominate the Court's affirmative action
jurisprudence and reflect the divisions just noted: (1) the institu-
tional competence of the authority implementing the race-conscious
program; (2) the program's factual predicate; and (3) its effect on
non-minority employees and contractors. How vigorously the Court
pursues each inquiry is a function of the standard of review it
applies. In addition, City of Richmond and Metro Broadcasting calibrate
the standard according to the state or federal character of the
implementing authority.
1. The Equal Access Construct and State-Sponsored Race-
Conscious Preferences: Bakke, Wygant and City of Richmond
In Bakke, a state medical school reserved sixteen out of one
hundred seats exclusively for minority applicants. 76
 In Wygant, a
school board and a teachers' union adopted a collective bargaining
agreement altering the traditional "last hired, first fired" rule in
(1967). Prior to City of Richmond, the Justices were divided on whether to apply the strict
scrutiny or intermediate test. E.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986);
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265 (1978). The Court also applies strict scrutiny to government action that encroaches upon
fundamental rights. E.g,, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
74
 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 407.
75
 The author has elaborated on this inconsistency at great length in Daly, supra note 26,
at 45-77.
76 438 U.S. at 275.
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order to preserve the jobs of recently hired minority teachers." In
City of Richmond, a city council set aside 30 percent of certain public
works contracts exclusively for minority business enterprises
(MBEs)." The Court's analysis in all three cases reflects an exag-
gerated concern for the political independence and the institutional
competence of the implementing authority.
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke set the tone for the subsequent
cases. He took a highly restrictive view of the Board of Regents'
competence, limiting it to policy decisions affecting education. 79
Justice Powell rejected the Board's competence to remedy societal
discrimination, characterizing it as "an amorphous concept of injury
that may be ageless in its reach into the past." 8" Thus, the Board
was competent to adopt a race-conscious program to promote di-
versity in the classroom, but incompetent to adopt one to hasten
the entry of minorities into the medical profession, from which they
had been routinely excluded in the past.
The competence issue in Wygant and City of Richmond was more
subtle than in Bakke. The Court did not dispute the competence of
the school board and the teachers' union in Wygant to amend the
seniority clause of the collective bargaining agreement..Nor did it
dispute the competence of the Richmond City Council to adopt
policies relating to the letting of public works contracts. In both
cases, the Court entertained reservations about the ultimate fairness
of the democratic process that led the admittedly competent bodies
to the adoption of the contested race-conscious preferences.
But in the vocabulary of affirmative action, competence in-
cludes more than the legal authority to make a decision; it includes
the entire decision-making process. In Wygant, an overwhelming
majority of the union membership voted to modify the seniority
clause to preserve recent gains in minority hiring. The modification,
however, did not affect them. Its burden fell exclusively on the most
junior white teachers.'" The Court seemed perturbed by an unfair-
ness in the process that allowed the majority to retain their jobs
77 476 U.S. at 276-71.
78 488 U.S. at 477-78.
79
 The Court's concern for competence is not limited to affirmative action cases. For
example, in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976), the Court struck down a civil
service regulation barring aliens from federal employment on the ground that the Civil
Service Commission "has no responsibility for foreign affairs, for treaty negotiations, for
establishing immigration quotas or conditions of entry, or for naturalization policies." Id. at
114.
" 438 U.S. at 307.
ai 476 U.S. at 281 n.8.
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while depriving others of theirs. The vote was not a sharing of a
burden; it was a shifting. 82 In City of Richmond, the Court's "com-
petence" review focused on the racial composition of the city coun-
cil. In contrast to the Board of Regents in Bakke and the school
board and teachers' union in Wygant, the Richmond City Council
was controlled by minority group members. Thus, it was a "minor-
ity" majority that voted to enact the MBE program. 83 This highly
unusual fact pattern led the Court to view the set-aside with great
suspicion. Attempting to hoist the proponents of the equal achieve-
ment construct by their own petard, the majority opinion even
quoted Professor Ely: "Of course, it works both ways: a law that
favors Blacks over Whites would be suspect if it were enacted by a
predominantly Black legislature." 84
The strength of the Court's attraction to the equal access con-
struct is revealed by considering an alternative holding, midway
between complete approval or rejection of race-conscious prefer-
ences. The Court could have invalidated Richmond's racial pref-
erences by invoking Ely's presumption and thus leaving for another
day the issue of which standard of review to apply to race-conscious
plans adopted by white majorities. The Court's decision, however,
clearly indicated that strict scrutiny applied across the board, re-
gardless of the racial make-up of the state implementing authority.
The Court attempted to justify its tough stance by anchoring
it in structural concerns. In Part II of her opinion, Justice O'Connor
drew a sharp line between the power of Congress to adopt race-
conscious preferences and the power of the states to do so. She
denied that power to the latter by invoking "the intentions of the
92 From Bakke to Metro Broadcasting, the Court has consistently demanded that burdens
resulting from race-conscious preferences not fall exclusively on "innocent" non-minorities.
The Constitution tolerates a sharing of burdens; it condemns their shifting. E.g., Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 484 (1980); see also Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747,
777 (1976). For a powerful indictment of the innocence strand of the Court's jurisprudence,
see Thomas Ross, Innocence and Affirmative Action, 43 VArio. L. Rev. 297 (1990); Kathleen M.
Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1985 Tenn--Comment: Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative
Action Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 78 (1986). Even if that indictment is rejected, the value of a
racially integrated economy outweighs the harm to non-minorities, especially in instances of
initial hiring and contract letting.
8' 488 U.S. at 495-96. One study has shown that there is a direct correlation between
the presence of a black mayor and the emergence of procurement programs designed to
guarantee MBEs a share of municipal contracts. TIMOTHY BATES, THE ROLE OF BLACK
ENTERPRISE IN URBAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ( joint Center for Political and Economic
Studies ed., 1990).
R4 488 U.S. at 496 (quoting John H. Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination,
41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723, 739 n.58 (1974)).
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Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, who desired to place clear
limits on the States' use of race as a criterion for legislative action,
and to have the federal courts enforce those limitations."" In ad-
dition, she expressed fear of "ced[ing] control over the content of
the Equal Protection Clause to the 50 State legislatures and their
myriad political subdivisions." 88
Part II of Justice O'Connor's opinion did not win the endorse-
ment of four other Justices (only Justices White and Rehnquist
joined in Part II). Nonetheless, the view she expressed must be
carefully considered in evaluating the Court's affirmative action
jurisprudence. Justice Kennedy concluded, "the summary in Part
II is both fair and precise."87 Justice Scalia's opinion concerning the
judgment seems identical to Justice O'Connor's on this point. 88 Of
the three dissenting Justices in City of Richmond, only Justice Black-
mun remains on the Court." Justice Stevens, while refusing to join
in Part II, voted to invalidate the set-aside and in a separate opinion
expressed a general mistrust of local legislative efforts to redress
racial discrimination not directly attributable to government ac-
tion. 9°
While the fine lines of the Court's jurisprudence of competence
are not clear, the shadow it casts over state and local race-conscious
programs is a long one. The BakkelWygantICity of Richmond triad
dims the visions of state and local governments, confining them to
remedying discrimination clearly attributable to them.
The full impact of this limitation cannot be appreciated, how-
ever, unless the Court's pronouncement concerning the factual
predicate of race-conscious programs is also understood. No mem-
ber of the Court has ever disputed the right of state and local
governments to use race-conscious preferences to remedy their own
acts of discrimination. That unanimity breaks down, however, when
the Court attempts to define the quantum and type of proof re-
" 488 U.S. at 490-91.
86 Id. at 490.
"Id. at 518 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice
Kennedy declined to join in Part II because "Wile process by which a law that is an equal
protection violation when enacted by a State becomes transformed to an equal protection
guarantee when enacted by Congress poses a difficult proposition for me; but as it is not
before us, any reconsideration of that issue must await some further case." Id.
" Justice Scalia declined to join Justice O'Connor's opinion only because he disagreed
with her conclusion that the Fourteenth Amendment permitted the state to correct "identi-
fied" discrimination. Id. at 520-22 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
" Justice Brennan retired on July 20,1990, and Justice Marshall on June 28,1991.
90
 488 U.S. at 511-18 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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quired before the state or local government can act. Terms such as
a "strong basis in evidence," "manifest imbalance" and "prima facie
case" are bandied about with little or no precision.•I The Court has
imposed rigorous requirements, moreover, with respect to statistical
proof. Factual predicates usually turn out to be fatally flawed if they
rest on comparisons between the percentage of minority employees
or contractors and the percentage of minorities in the population
or general labor pool. The Court demands comparisons based on
more refined labor/entrepreneurial statistics.°
The Court insists, moreover, upon detailed evidence identify-
ing the present number of MBEs available and competent to bid
on each project, the dollar value of contracts let to MBEs and the
dollar value of total city projects.95
 Its opinion renders as a virtual
necessity sociological and economic studies of the public work sector
of the construction industry to show patterns of discrimination and
exclusion. 94
How harshly the Court's insistence on an elaborate factual
predicate binds the states is dramatically illustrated in City of Rich-
mond. The City Council did not enact the set-aside without reflec-
tion. It held several days of hearings at which considerable testi-
mony was given describing the difficulties minority enterprises
encountered in obtaining city contracts. One statistic was particu-
larly prominent. While the population of Richmond was 50 percent
African-American, black-owned business received only .67 percent
of the City's public contracts. 95
 This bleak statistic hardly startled
the City Council. After all, Richmond was the former capital of the
Confederacy and had persistently avoided recognizing the economic
and political needs of its black population until long after Brown v.
Board of Education. 96
 Furthermore, the City Council was well ac-
quainted with the myriad of Congressional studies demonstrating
the pervasiveness of racism in the construction industry. Ironically,
"	 Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616,626-34 passim (1987) (manifest
racial imbalance); Wyganl, 476 U.S. at 277 (plurality opinion) (a strong basis in evidence);
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193,209 (1979) (manifest racial imbalance).
See also Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299,307 (1977) (prima facie case).
92 See Daly, supra note 34, at 1077-94.
91 488 U.S. at 499-506.
94 Id.; see also id. at 519-20 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 479-80.
'*s For example, in the 1970s, when the African-American population approached ma-
jority voting control, Richmond municipal authorities endeavored to annex nearby white
boroughs to assure continuing white control. City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S.
358 (1975).
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one of the studies showed that MBEs received only .65 percent of
the gross receipts generated in the construction industry nation-
wide."' Armed with the knowledge of Congress, its own statistics
and public testimony of discrimination in Richmond, the City Coun-
cil adopted an MBE program directly modeled on the federal pro-
gram that the Court had approved in Fullitove." Nonetheless, the
Court struck down the Richmond plan, finding it satisfied neither
prong of the strict scrutiny test. The Court was highly critical of
the factual predicate upon which the City Council acted as well as
its decision to designate minorities other than African-Americans
as beneficiaries of the plan.""
The problem with the Court's insistence is that it amounts to
an endorsement of the status quo. The more pervasive the discrim-
ination, the smaller the percentage of minorities in any given oc-
cupation or profession. When the Court criticizes the Richmond
City Council for selecting a 30 percent set-aside figure, it is in effect
telling the City Council that it must placidly accept the success rate
of discrimination. Logic and justice compel the opposite conclusion:
where racism has been most effective in excluding minorities, gov-
ernment should be least constrained. The smaller the percentage
of minorities, the greater the latitude the Court should accord to
government efforts to hasten the entry of previously excluded mi-
norities.
To argue for latitude is not to defend unchecked discretion.
The doctrines that the Court has developed to protect the employ-
ment and contracting rights of majority employees and entrepre-
neurs serve the government's interest in seeing that no member of
the body politic suffers undue harm from legislative and executive
action. 100
The final difficulty with the Court's opinion in City of Richmond
is its insistence on failed alternatives.' 01
 This requirement obligates
the government actor to commit finances and human capital to a
prospect that the actor believes is either doomed to failure or cannot
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448,465-66 (1980).
98
 488 U.S. at 477-81. The only major difference dealt with the size of the Set-aside.
Congress set the figure at 10%, a figure which fell halfway between the percentage of
minorities in the general population and the percentage of minority contractors. The Rich-
mond City Council selected a 30% figure, a figure which was slightly more than halfway
between the percentage of local minority contractors and the percentage of minorities in
Richmond. Id. at 551 (Marshall,.., dissenting).
99 Id. at 506.
m° See infra notes 277-94 and accompanying text.
n" 488 U.S. at 507-08.
930	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 (Vol. 33:903
accomplish the desired goal of economic integration at the same
rate of speed, efficiency and cost-control as an MBE program. In
theory, the government actor could proceed without trying such an
alternative; but it would then run the risk of having a court strike
down the MBE program, unless it could persuade the court that no
viable alternative existed. 1 °2
 Even if the government actor initiated
an alternative program and it failed, there is still no guarantee a
court will not order exploration and implementation of other alter-
natives before allowing a race-conscious program to proceed. Iron-
ically, City of Richmond's insistence on failed alternatives promotes a
kind of judicial activism that the Court is quick to squelch in equal
protection, rational basis review.
The City of Richmond Court bears an uncanny resemblance to
the Lochner Court, picking and choosing among state policies ac-
cording to the decisionmakers' personal visions of the just society.
Regardless of the ideological label pasted on its decisions, since 1936
the Court has consistently refused to independently review socio-
economic regulations. Three interlocking reasons are advanced for
its refusal: (1) the Court's institutional incompetency to evaluate
such legislation; (2) the primacy of the political branches of the
national government in such matters; and (3) with respect to state
legislation, concern for preserving the federal structure of govern-
ment. What is striking about City of Richmond is the complete absence
of reference to any of these considerations.
Although members of the City of Richmond Court are willing to
extol the virtues of local government in other contexts, they do an
about-face if racial preferences are involved.'°' A brief survey of
the Court's jurisprudence regarding constitutional constraints on
hiring and public works employment illustrates this point in stark
102 E.g., Krupa v. New Castle County, 56 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases (BNA) 779, 796 (D. Del.
1990) (striking down a race-conscious promotion plan on the ground that "less racially
burdensome alternatives" existed).
1" Both Justice O'Connor and Chief justice Rehnquist supported the Court's opinion in
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), which restricted Congress's Com-
merce Clause authority over the states "in areas of traditional governmental functions." Id.
at 852. Both joined in the dissent when the Court overruled Usey. Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 557 (1985). Justice O'Connor has not infrequently
championed the rights of the states at the expense of the national government. E.g., South
Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 212-18 (1987) (O'Connor, j., dissenting); FERC v. Mississippi,
456 U.S. 742, 779 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See also Community Communications
Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 60 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting; Justice O'Connor
joining in the dissent). Professor Sullivan develops this point at greater length in Kathleen
M. Sullivan, City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.: The Backlash Against Affirmative Action, 64
Tut.. L. REV. 1609, 1616-18 (1990).
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relief. Imagine that the Richmond City Council had concluded that
the municipality's tax base and growth were hampered by growing
unemployment. The Court would have permitted Richmond to
enact legislation requiring all new employees to reside within its
borders. Neither the fundamental right to travel nor the Equal
Protection Clause prohibits such legislation.'"
The Richmond City Council would be free to require construc-
tion companies to employ a specified percentage of residents on
public works projects without violating the Commerce Clause. Nor
has the Court made the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article
IV an absolute bar to such preferences. 1 °5 The Court has permitted
a city to prefer its own residents over out-of-staters on public works
projects.m° The Court curtails Richmond's freedom to experiment
precisely where it is most needed: to open the marketplace to ex-
cluded groups. The parallels to Lochner and the Court's pre-1936
jurisprudence are clear: the fragility of women and the safety of
miners merited limited government intervention in the market-
place. 1 °7
 The health of bakers was no business of the state. Today,
stagnating municipal economies merit limited government interven-
tion in the marketplace. Racial and gender justice is no business of
the state.
104
 McCarthy v, Philadelphia Civil Serv." Comm'n, 424 U.S. 645 (1976) (per curium).
LOS In United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208 (1984),
the Court refused a wholesale incorporation of the market participant exception to the
Commerce Clause into its Privileges and Immunities Clause jurisprudence. It preferred a
case-by-case analysis inquiring (I) whether the out-of-staters were the peculiar source of the
evil to be eradicated, and (2) whether the employment plan was sufficiently tailored to remedy
the identified evil.
L°6 White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204 (1983). See gen-
erally Dan 'F. Comm, Untangling the Market -Participant Exemption to the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 88 Mien. L. REV. 395 (1989).
o' Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 423 (1908) (refusing to strike down on substantive
due process grounds a state statute limiting working hours for women); Holden v. Hardy,
169 U.S. 366, 380-81, 398 (1898) (same, upholding state statute limiting working hours for
miners). One scholar has pointed out the "striking historical irony in the parallel between
the argument for a color-blind Constitution and the way in which the Court provided
constitutional protection for the privileges of the new economic elite after the Civil War."
JOHN C. LIVINGSTON, FAIR GAME? INEQUALITY AND AFFIRMATIVE Action 93 (1979). According
to Professor Livingston, between 1883 and 1936, the Court used the term "liberty" in the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' Due Process Clauses to void state and federal efforts to
control new concentrations of economic power. It fashioned a notion of equal protection
that insisted upon absolute government neutrality between the wealthy and powerful on the
one hand, and the poor and powerless on the other. Id. at 96-97. Instead of color-blind, the
Court was both wealth-blind and color-blind. The Court's about-face in 1936 thus gives a
new meaning to equality, permitting the New Deal to enact beneficent legislation advancing
the interests of the working class and the poor at the expense of industry and the financially
secure. Id.
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2. The Equal Achievement Construct and Congressionally
Adopted Race-Conscious Preferences: Fullilove and Metro
Broadcasting
The power and discretion the Court so vigilantly denies to the
states it readily grants to Congress. In Fullilove, the Court reviewed
the constitutionality of section 103(f)(2) of the Public Works' Em-
ployment Act of 1977 (PWEA). That statute appropriated $4 billion
in federal grant money to state and local governments for public
works construction. The statute's goal was to stimulate the sluggish
economy by infusing money into the mordant construction industry.
Section 103(f)(2) mandated that "at least ten per centum of the
amount of each grant shall be expended for minority business
enterprises."' 08
Section 103(f )(2) was the first legislation since the Reconstruc-
tion to restrict government benefits to racially defined groups.w°
The statute defined "minority business enterprise" as "a business at
least 50 per centum of which is owned by minority group members
or, in case of a publicly owned business, at least 51 per centum of
the stock of which is owned by minority group members.""° To
qualify for the set-aside, applicants had to be citizens and be Negro,
Spanish-speaking, Oriental, Indian, Eskimo or Aleut.'"
The highly unusual character of the set-aside is even more
remarkable in light of the complete absence of legislative history.
The amendment containing the MBE proposal was made from the
floor of the House. No record explains the selection of the MBE
device over other alternatives to promote the growth of minority
construction firms, how Congress arrived at the 10 percent figure,
or its rationale in selecting the particular racial groups benefiting
from the set-aside. 112
Despite these considerable infirmities, the Court sustained the
set-aside. It did so, however, without deciding which standard of
review to apply."' Although no single opinion commanded the
m" Pub. L. No. 95-28, tit. 1, § 103, 91 Stat. 116 (1977) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6705(b)(2)
(1982)).
1 " Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 549 (1980) (Stevens, j., dissenting).
110
 Pub. L. No. 95-28, tit. 1, § 103, 91 Stat. 116 (1977) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f)(2)
(1982)).
In M.
" 2 See Mary C. Daly, Stotts' Denial of Hiring and Promotion Preferences for Nonvictims:
Draining the "spirit" from Title VII, 14 FORDHAM Usti. L.J. 17, 48-49 (1986).
" 3 Chief Justice Burger's opinion, which was joined by Justices White and Powell, con-
cluded that Congress's action satisfied both standards. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 491-92. Justice
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support of a majority of the justices, considerable consensus existed
on several key issues. First, with respect to competence, the Justices
agreed that the Constitution endowed Congress with an extraordi-
nary arsenal of power by virtue of the Spending Power, the Com-
merce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.t' 4 Sec-
ond, the Court rejected the claim that before Congress could act it
needed a detailed set of factual findings to support its selection of
race-conscious remedies. t5 The factual predicate needed by Con-
gress and the one needed by the states are light years apart. The
Court also rejected a corollary claim that Congress could not act
without specifically considering a detailed record of failed alterna-
tives."" Finally, it emphasized the short duration of the set-aside
program and its limited impact on majority contractors." 7
Metro Broadcasting picks up where Fullilove left off." 8 Under
challenge in Metro Broadcasting were two race-conscious policies
adopted by the FCC. The first policy announced that minority
ownership and participation were "plus" factors in selecting among
competing applicants for radio and television licenses; the second
policy created an exception to the FCC's no-transfer rule, prohib-
Powell continued to adhere to his position in Bakke that strict scrutiny was called for, but
found that standard satisfied. Id. at 507-10 (Powell, J., concurring). Justices Marshall, Bren-
nan and Blackmun applied the intermediate test standard and concluded Congress's enact-
ment of the 10% set-aside was constitutional. Id. at 517-21 (Marshall, J., concurring).
" 4 Id, at 472-80; id. at 499-502,508-10 (Powell, J., concurring).
115 Chief Justice Burger noted the numerous studies before Congress. Id. at 478. Justice
Powell was insistent that adjudicatory-type procedures were not required. Id. at 503 (Powell,
J., concurring).
"6 /d. at 478; id. at 502-06 (Powell, J., concurring).
l" Id. at 484-85; id. at 513 (Powell, J., concurring).
" 6 How durable Metro Broadcasting turns out to be is an open question. It was a 5-4
decision, with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy dissenting.
Two of the five Justices in the majority have now retired. Justice Brennan, the author of the
opinion, was replaced by Justice Souter, whose views on affirmative action are not known.
Justice Thomas replaced Justice Marshall. In his confirmation hearings, when asked about
Metro Broadcasting, Justice Thomas carefully couched his reply: "1 have no basis as a judge
to disagree with it." Stuart Taylor, Jr., Beware the Judicial Override, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3,1991,
at A25. After his appointment to the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia released its decision in Lamprecht v. FCC, 958 F.2d 382 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (striking
down a gender-based preference for women similar to the race-based preference upheld in
Metro Broadcasting). Justice Thomas wrote the majority opinion in Lamprecht, In applying the
intermediate standard the opinion faults the absence of "any statistically meaningful link
between ownership by women and programming of any particular kind" and thus distin-
guishes the record before the Supreme Court in Metro Broadcasting. Id. What this opinion
sharply suggests is Justice Thomas's distaste for group-based preferences and his willingness
to engage in a demanding examination of the evidence relied upon by the implementing
body to justify the challenged preference.
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iting the sale of licenses subject to noncompliance hearings." 9 The
exception permitted the sale of such licenses if the purchaser could
demonstrate minority ownership and if the sale price did not exceed
75 percent of the fair market value.' 2°
Relying on the consensus expressed in Fullilove, a five Justice
majority held both race-conscious preferences valid. Going beyond
Fullilove, the majority adopted the intermediate standard of review.
Writing for the Court Justice Brennan began his opinion on a
cautionary note: "[W]e are 'bound to approach our task with ap-
propriate deference to Congress, a co-equal branch charged by the
Constitution with the power to 'provide for the . . . general Welfare
of the United States' and 'to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. '"121
From this premise, it took little constitutional energy to reach the
conclusion that intermediate review, rather than strict scrutiny, was
called for. To justify race-conscious preferences Congress must
show that "they serve important governmental objectives within the
power of Congress and are substantially related to the achievement
of those objectives." 122
In the catechism of constitutional jurisprudence, this standard
is demanding. How the Court actually applies it is an entirely dif-
ferent matter. In reviewing other kinds of legislation, the Court has
not hesitated to employ the intermediate test as a sword striking
down governmental action that rests on stereotypes or disadvan-
tages unpopular groups.'" In reviewing race-conscious preferences,
the Court has used it as a shield, protecting governmental action
benefiting disadvantaged groups. To paraphrase Professor
Gunther, the intermediate test as applied to race-conscious prefer-
ences is strict in theory, indulgent in effect.
Metro Broadcasting demands even less of Congress than Fullilove.
For example, the Court did not require specific statutory authori-
zation for the FCC's race-conscious preferences. It implied such
authorization from three appropriations acts that barred the FCC
from reconsidering the challenged policies.' 24 It casually relied on
19 Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 110 S. Ct. 2997,3002-05 (1990).
120 Id. at 3005.
121 Id. at 3008 (quoting Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 472).
127 Id. at 3009.
123 E.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (stereotyping of
male and female nurses); Lath v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (disadvantaging illegitimate
children); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (same); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976) (stereotyping of male automobile drivers, ages 18-2 I).
144 110 S. Ct. at 3016.
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a number of studies and hearings showing Congress's awareness of
the small number of broadcast licenses held by minorities: 25 It
required very little proof to show that minority ownership promoted
diversity in broadcasting, and it required no proof at all to show
that prior government policies were responsible for the small num-
ber of minority licensees. In short, while the totality of the evidence
in the record was certainly worthy of some weight, the indulgence
of the Court's review was startling considering the race-conscious
character of the FCC's policies.
111. CONGRESS'S POWER UNDER SECTION 5 OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT TO PERMIT THE STATES TO ADOPT RACE-CONSCIOUS
PREFERENCES
Both Fullilove and Metro Broadcasting stand for the proposition
that Congress possesses sweeping authority to implement race-con-
scious preferences in federal programs. It would be a mistake to
view these cases in isolation, however. Their constitutional vitality
grows even more robust when they are linked to doctrine acknowl-
edging Congress's unique power to find facts and fashion remedies
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. When fused, Ful-
lilove, Metro Broadcasting and Section 5 furnish Congress with a
powerful tool to "rebuild the City of Richmond" by allowing the
states to adopt MBE programs and other race-conscious prefer-
ences.
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress "the
power to enforce . by appropriate legislation" the equal protection
guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment: 26
 The seeds of the
125 Id. at 3009-16.
226 U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, 5. Some scholars have maintained that the 1866 Freed-
man's Bureau Act and other legislation enacted in the immediate post-Civil War era dem-
onstrate an intent on the part of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment to approve race-
conscious remedies. E.g., Scherer, supra note 34, at 285-88; Eric Schnapper, Affirmative
Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753 (1985). There
are, however, two serious flaws with this argument. First, if the statutes demonstrate anything,
it is the intent of the Reconstruction Congress to aid the actual victims of slavery. Benefits
to slaves who earned their freedom before the Emancipation Proclamation were incidental.
Second, the statutes generally granted benefits to "refugees," a term used to describe destitute
Whites loyal to the Union. Contemporary debate suggests that aid limited to the newly
emancipated slaves would not have passed if refugees had been excluded. HERMAN BELZ, A
NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: THE REPUBLICAN PARTY AND FREEDMAN'S RIGHTS 1861-1866,69—
112 (1976). For a comprehensive analysis of the political and constitutional ideology of the
Reconstruction Congress, see Robert J. Kaczorowski, The Enforcement Provisions of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866: A Legislative History in Light of Runyon v. McCrary, 98 YALE L.J. 565 (1989);
Robert J. Kaczorowski, To Begin the Nation Anew: Congress, Citizenship, and Civil Rights After the
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Court's modern Section 5 jurisprudence were sown in Katzenbach v.
Morgan.' 27 Prior to Katzenbach, the Court in Lassiter v. Northhampton
County Board of Elections' 28 had unanimously upheld the constitu-
tionality of a North Carolina statute imposing an English language
literacy test. New York State had a similar statute, the practical
effect of which was to disenfranchise the state's Puerto Rican resi-
dents. When it passed the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Congress
included in section 4(e) a provision requiring the states to permit
any citizen to vote who possessed a sixth-grade education from a
public school under the jurisdiction of the United States, including
Puerto Rico.' 29 Section 4(e) specifically provided that the states could
not deny such citizens the right to vote because of an inability "to
read, write, understand, or interpret any matter in the English
language. . . ." 13° New York State challenged the constitutionality
of section 4(e). Relying on Lassiter it argued that Congress lacked
the authority to outlaw a practice the Court had previously held
constitutional. The Court flatly rejected the argument. Writing for
the majority, Justice Brennan observed that Section 5 "is a positive
grant of legislative authority authorizing Congress to exercise its
discretion in determining whether and what legislation is needed
to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment."'" The
Court's deference to Congress's power under Section 5 in Katzenbach
is not idiosyncratic. It has permitted Congress to rely on Section 5
to abrogate state immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. 192 It
has acknowledged similar sweeping enforcement power under the
Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments as well.' 33
The majority opinion in Katzenbach advanced two separate the-
ories to support the Court's holding. The first elaborated a highly
controversial proposition that granted Congress the right to define
constitutional wrongdoings despite a previous substantive Supreme
Civil War, 92 AM. HIST. Rev. 45 (1987); Roberti. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism
in the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863 (1986).
127
 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
' 2' 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
129
 384 U.S. at 643.
1 " Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, tit. 1, § 4(e), 79 Stat. 438 (1965),
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e)(2) 0 988)).
0 ' 384 U.S. at 651.
12 Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
'" City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980) (Fifteenth Amendment); Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (Thirteenth Amendment).
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Court decision to the contrary.' 34 The second drew on Congress's
traditional role as factfinder and its power to fashion remedies. 135
While the first theory has been the subject of great debate,"
that debate need not be resolved to advance the conclusion reached
in this article. This article argues that Congress can use its acknowl-
edged power to find facts and fashion remedies as a basis for
extending to the states the same power it possesses to adopt race-
conscious preferences in federal programs.'" Part IV specifically
details the kinds of facts on which Congress should focus.
This article champions Congress's constitutional powers to au-
thorize the states to adopt race-conscious preferences. It does not
press Congress to require the states to implement affirmative action
programs. The proposed statute leaves that decision to the states'
discretion.' 38 This distinction has both constitutional and political
implications. Many critics of Katzenbach v. Morgan complained that
it contained the seeds of destruction of the nation's federal system
of government. They argued that the Court's deference to Con-
gress's Section 5 authority placed no limits on the reach of the
national government into the political structures of state govern-
ment. Congress's Section 5 power, when joined with its Commerce
Clause authority, created a behemoth capable of ousting the states
from positions of political, economic and regulatory power within
the federal system. The virtue of the legislation proposed in this
1 " 384 U.S. at 648-51.
1 " Id. at 653-56.
15" E.g., id. at 659-71 (Harlan, J., dissenting); EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 251-59
(1983) (Burger, CJ., dissenting); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 752-
33 (1983); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 204-05 (1970). See also Alexander M. Bickel,
The Voting Rights Cases, 1966 SUP. CT. Rev. 79; Robert A. Rohrer, Bakke, Weber & Fullilove:
Benign Discrimination and Congressional Power to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, 56 IND. L.J.
473 (1981); Stephen L. Carter, The Morgan "Power" and the Forced Reconsideration of Consti-
tutional Decisions, 53 U. Cm, L. REV. 819 (1986); William Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret
Due Process and Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L. REV. 603, 606 (1975).
1117 For a specific discussion of areas of Congressional factfinding and the scope of
appropriate remedies consistent with Fullilove and Metro Broadcasting, see infra notes 276-95
and accompanying text.
1" In this author's view, Congress does indeed possess the authority under Section 5 to
enact legislation requiring race-conscious preferences. Several distinguished scholars have
acknowledged Congress's power to fashion substantive rights under Section 5. E.g., LaueeNce,
H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNsTrruTtoNat. LAW §* 5-12-15, at 330-50 (2d ed. 1988). Archibald
Cox, The Role of the Congress in Constitutional Determinations, 40 U. ON. L. REV. 199 (1971);
Archibald Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 'Perm—Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and Pro-
motion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. Rev. 91 (1966); Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure: The
Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978).
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article is that it restores power to the states. The traditional feder-
alism arguments mounted in opposition to Katzenbach v. Morgan are
simply out of place.
The argument advanced herein draws strong support from the
analogy the Court expressed in Katzenbach between Congress's Sec-
tion 5 power and its powers under the Necessary and Proper Clause.
The Court concluded that the framers of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment intended to give Congress "the same broad powers expressed
in the Necessary and Proper Clause." 3° From the stewardship of
John Marshall to the present, the Court has held those powers to
be plenary.'" The only check that limits Congress's Necessary and
Proper Clause authority is the Bill of Rights itself. Undoubtedly,
opponents of race-conscious preferences will contend that the equal
protection component of the Fifth Amendment trumps the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause, cabining Congress's power to the equal
access construct. Fullilove and Metro Broadcasting shatter that argu-
ment. In both cases the Court recognized a panoply of constitutional
power at Congress's disposal to fashion programs embodying the
equal achievement construct.
That Congress has the right to allow the states to act where
they otherwise might be constitutionally prohibited from doing so
is beyond dispute.' 4 ' Commerce Clause doctrine offers the most
direct guidance. The issue first arose in 1851 in Cooley v. Board of
Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia. 142 Among the earliest statutes
enacted by the first Congress was legislation permitting the states
to regulate pilotage. 14" In conformity with the statutory authoriza-
"g 384 U.S. at 650.
"" McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 319 (1819). Marshall formulated the
classic definition of those powers in McCulloch:
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all
means which are appropriate, which are plainly adopted to that end, which are
not prohibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are
constitutional.
Id. at 421. Very similar language can be found in Ex Parte Virginia, 199 U.S. 339, 345-46
(1879). The Court has also held that these same principles govern Section 2 of the Fifteenth
Amendment. Section 2 authorizes Congress to enforce "by appropriate legislation" that
Amendment's prohibitions. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 391, 326 (1966). Accord
James Everard's Breweries v. Day, 265 U.S. 545, 558-59 (1924) (Eighteenth Amendment).
141 For a persuasive elaboration of the proposition that "Congress should be able to
approve unconstitutional policy choices in state laws when Congress is not constitutionally
prohibited from directly adopting the same policy itself," see William Cohen, Congressional
Power to Validate Unconstitutional State Laws: A Forgotten Solution to an Old Enigma, 35 STAN. L.
REV. 387, 388 (1983).
' 42 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
" 5 Act of Congress of Aug. 7, 1789, I Stat. 54.
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tion, Pennsylvania required that local pilots be employed in steering
ships in and out of the port of Philadelphia. A ship owner who was
fined for failing to hire a local pilot appealed to the Supreme Court
arguing, inter alia, that the Commerce Clause prevented Congress
from ceding its regulatory power to the states. Setting the tone for
future cases, the Court acknowledged Congress's sweeping author-
ity in making legislative judgments pursuant to the Commerce
Clause. 144
Cooley is important for another reason. It injected into consti-
tutional jurisprudence the distinction between "local" and "national"
matters. The states were free to regulate, despite any impact on
interstate commerce, provided that the regulation's subject matter
demanded diverse treatment. On the other hand, if the regulation's
subject matter demanded uniform national treatment, only Con-
gress could legislate. 145 While the local/national distinction is no
longer the fulcrum of the Court's decision making, it remains an
important consideration in modern Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence.
The local character of the matter being regulated and the
practical unlikelihood of Congress's acting are both considerations
invoked by the Court when Congress specifically delegates Com-
merce Clause power to the states. Parker v. Brown 146 precisely illus-
trates this point. In that case, California had enacted a complex
scheme for marketing raisins, the effect of which gave California
producers control over almost all the raisins sold in the United
States and almost one-half of the world's crop. The scheme with-
stood what otherwise would have been a fatal constitutional attack,
because Congress had enacted umbrella legislation approving sim-
ilar state legislation in generic form."'
The lessons from Cooley and Parker are clear. Congress can
authorize the states to act using an enumerated power otherwise
reserved to Congress. Cooley and Parker pave the way for a structural
solution to the City of RichmondlMetro Broadcasting gap.
The Court's jurisprudence under Section 2 of the Fifteenth
Amendment extends additional support for the Section 5, Four-
teenth Amendment arguments elaborated in this section. The Fif-
teenth Amendment cautions the states against denying or abridging
144 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 318.
145
 TRIBE, supra note 138, § 6-4, at 406-07.
146 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
m Id. at 357-58, 365-68.
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"[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote . . . on account
of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."'" Section 2 gives
Congress the power to enforce this provision by appropriate legis-
lation.'49 Recognizing the long-standing systemic obstacles to mean-
ingful minority participation in state and local political communities,
Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to eradicate all
forms of racial discrimination in voting."
There are a number of striking similarities between the Court's
interpretation of Congress's Section 2 and Section 5 powers. Two
features particularly stand out. The first is the Court's comparison
of Congress's Section 2 powers to those conferred on it by the
Necessary and Proper Clause.' 5 ' This interpretation naturally en-
tails the proposition that Congress possesses exceedingly broad dis-
cretion to find facts and fashion remedies. The Court has labelled
as "artificial" any suggestion that Section 2 limits Congress to for-
bidding violation of the Fifteenth Amendment in general terms. 152
The second is the Court's acknowledgment that to facilitate minority
political participation a state may consider race in carving electoral
districts.' 53
 If a state may take the race of voters into account to
facilitate political integration and participation, logic compels it
should be able to take the race of applicants, employees and con-
tractors into consideration to facilitate economic integration.'"
This conclusion, moreover, is reinforced by the Court's ready
acceptance of social science data revealing racial bloc voting.' 55 As
discussed at greater length in Part IV of this article, there is ample
1413 U.S. CoNsr. amend. XV, § 1.
"9 Section 2 provides: "The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appro-
priate legislation." Id. 2. Its wording is almost identical to that of Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment: "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article." U.S. Coms .r, amend. X1V, § 5.
no Pub. L. No. 89-110, tit. I, $ 2, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. $ 1973
(1988)).
151 South Carolina v, Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326-27 (1966).
152 Id. at 327.
153 United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S, 144, 167-68 (1977).
154
 The link between voting and employment was clear to the Congress that enacted the
1964 Civil Rights Act. "The right to vote, however, does not have much meaning on an
empty stomach, The impetus to achieve excellence in education is lacking if gainful employ-
ment is closed to the graduate. The opportunity to enter a restaurant or hotel is shallow
victory where one's pockets are empty." HOUSE Comm. ON THE JUDICIARY, CIVIL RIGHTS Acr
OF 1963, H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 26 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2513.
155 For an illuminating and thought-provoking discussion of this literature, see Lani
Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black Electoral Success,
89 MICH. L. REV. 1077 (1991).
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social science literature documenting similar decision making in
employment and contracting selection procedures) 56
 The mindset
that prompts white voters to reject candidates of color also prompts
them to disadvantage applicants, employees and contractors of
color. Unconscious racial bias does not stop at the voting booth. If
Congress can authorize the states to take steps to minimize racial
bloc voting, it can authorize them to act in the work and market
places, especially their own work and market places. Principles of
racial justice and fairness demand that the Court define Congress's
enforcement powers under Section 2 and Section 5 in symmetric
terms.
Finally, additional support for Congress's invocation of its Sec-
tion 5 powers can be found in recent lower federal court decisions
dismissing equal protection challenges to state race-conscious MBE
programs adopted to satisfy section 106(c)(1) of the Surface Trans-
portation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987) 57 Section
106(c)(1) provides that in dispensing federal monies supplied to the
states for highway construction, the states must ensure that 10
percent of the amounts appropriated are "expended with small
business concerns owned and controlled by socially and economi-
cally disadvantaged individuals." 158
 Department of Transportation
regulations create a rebuttable presumption that members of des-
ignated minority groups are socially and economically disadvan-
taged)59
 Members of other groups must prove their entitlement to
the designation on a case-by-case basis."' Non-minority contractors
have challenged state compliance with the federal regulators, ar-
guing that under City of Richmond, the states' MBE programs must
satisfy the strict scrutiny test. To date no court has accepted their
argument. The leading case is Milwaukee County Pavers Ass'n, in
which Judge Posner wrote the opinion for an unanimous pane1) 6 '
'M See infra notes 208-27 and accompanying text. See also generally Daniel George-Abeyie,
Law Enforcement and Racial and Ethnic Bias, 19 FLA. Sr. U. L. REV. 717 (1992).
' 5 ' Pub. L. No. 100-17, § 106(c), 101 Stat. 132, 145 (1987).
158 1d. § 106(c)(1).
159
 49 C.F.R. § 23.5 (1991). Among the designated minority groups are Blacks, Hispanics,
Portuguese, Asian-Americans, American Indians and Alaskan Natives. Id. § 23.5(a)—(c). See
also id. pt. 23, subpt. D, app. A (offering interpretive elaboration on the term "socially and
economically disadvantaged individuals").
' 60 1d. § 23.5(f) (1991).
ICE
 Milwaukee County Pavers Ass'n v. Fiedler, 922 F.2d 419 (7th Cir,), cert. denied, Ill S.
Ct. 2261 (1991); accord Tennessee Asphalt Co. v. Farris, 942 F.2d 969, 975 (6th Cir. 1991);
Coral Constr. Co. v. King County, 941 F.2d 910, 925 (9th Cir. 1991); O'Donnell Constr. Co.
v. District of Columbia, 762 F. Supp. 354, 368-69 (D.D.C. 1991); Michigan Road Builders
Ass'n v. Blanchard, 761 F. Supp. 1303, 1314-15 (W.D. Mich. 1991).
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He concluded that Fullilove precluded a successful constitutional
challenge to the statute's set-aside and that, as "agents" of the fed-
eral government, the states were entitled to similar protection. In-
voking the Commerce Clause analogy discussed earlier, he con-
cluded:
The joint lesson of Fullilove and Croson is that the federal
government can, by virtue of the enforcement clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, engage in affirmative action
with a freer hand than states and municipalities can do.
And one way it can do that is by authorizing states to do
things that they could not do without federal authoriza-
tion. 162
Judge Posner's "lesson" points the way to ending the senseless
bifurcation of government power over race-conscious preferences
created by City of Richmond and Metro-Broadcasting. Part IV explains
why Congress should act on the "lesson of Fullilove and Croson" and
adopt a policy of inclusion, allowing the states to "rebuild the City
of Richmond" and dismantle the glass ceilings in their own bureau-
cracies.
IV. WHY CONGRESS SHOULD ACT
A. The Need for a National Policy
The Court's selection of two substantively different standards
of review to judge the constitutionality of race-conscious prefer-
ences is troubling. While, as an analytical matter, the selection may
be defensible by reference to the intent of the framers of the Four-
teenth Amendment, it is unsatisfying on an intuitive level. Both
federal and state governments are operating with the same goal in
mind—the dissolution of the infrastructure of economic apartheid
that has locked minorities into low-paying, low-status jobs. It defies
common sense to deny the states an effective weapon in this diffi-
cult, complex struggle. The insight of Madison, Jay and Hamilton
is no less powerful today than it was in 1789: The unit of govern-
ment closest to the citizenry is far more likely to understand and
solve the problems of the immediate community than a distant
t"' 922 F.2d at 423-24. See supra note 4, pointing out how the Court of Appeals, relying
on City of Richmond, simultaneously struck down an identical set-aside adopted by the state
in its sovereign capacity.
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national bureaucracy cabined by ideological baggage unresponsive
to local needs.'"
By lowering the standard of review for Congressional legisla-
tion and heightening it for state legislation, the Court has frustrated
legitimate efforts to eradicate the economic barriers separating
whites and blacks. Given the Republican Party's control of the White
House and the Democratic Party's control of the Congress and their
opposite views on set-asides, the likelihood of Fullilove MBE set-
asides or Metro Broadcasting minority preferences being adopted on
the national level is remote. The heightened standard of review
virtually guarantees the failure of local initiatives. The end result is
the continued exclusion of minorities from important avenues of
economic opportunity.
Government paralysis on an issue as vital to the nation's con-
tinued well-being as economic apartheid is only to be regretted.
That it is the result of fragmented and polarized decision making
by the branch of government most completely insulated from dem-
ocratic pressures simply intensifies the distress.
There is, moreover, another frequently overlooked side to the
issue of race-conscious preferences that merits attention. As noted
earlier, while courts and philosophers have been busy debating the
statutory and constitutional legitimacy of affirmative action plans,
private and public sector employers and contracting officials have
been adopting them at an extraordinary rate. They are now a
familiar feature of personnel and contracting decisions.'"
Because the issue of race-conscious preferences so acutely im-
plicates the fundamental notion of equality which is central to the
nation's psyche and to its self-definition in global politics, leaving
policy decisions concerning these preferences to be made behind
closed doors is an abdication of responsibility. The engine of the
nation's economy is fired in significant measure by public sector
employment and contracting. Allowing individual public sector of-
ficials in thousands of locales to define the contours of the nation's
solution to complex social ills borders on the reckless. When Con-
gress perceived that the concentration of economic power in the
trusts was strangling competition and injuring future growth, it
passed the Sherman Act.'" When Congress concluded that the
bargaining powers of capital tilted precipitously against the interests
163 THE FEDERALIST Nos. 17, 46 ( James Madison).
'" See supra notes 36-37, 56-68 and accompanying text.
' 65 Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890).
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of the working class, it passed the National Labor Relations Act.' 66
When Congress confronted the legacy of segregation that was rend-
ing the nation's social and political fabric, it passed the Civil Rights
Acts of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the Fair Housing Act
of 1968 and the Equal Employment Act of 1972. 167 As Professor
Sandalow has observed:
Wf governmental action trenches upon values that may
be regarded as fundamental, that action should be the
product of a deliberately broadly based political judgment.
The stronger the argument that government action does
encroach upon such value, the greater the need to assure
us that it is the product of a process that is entitled to
speak for society. Legislation that has failed to engage the
attention of Congress, like the decision of subordinate
governmental institutions, does not meet that test, for it
is likely to be the product of partial political pressures that
are not broadly reflective of the society as a whole.'"
Additionally, reliance on the Court, executive agency officials
and private entities "threatens to supplant the process of self-gov-
ernment spelled out in the constitutional plan." 69 Arguably, Con-
gress has purposely decided to leave the issue of preferences in
public employment and contracting to the states and local govern-
ments. No support exists for this proposition, however. Even if the
proposition had support, the Court foreclosed reliance by adopting
the most rigorous standard of review: strict in theory, fatal in fact.
Congress's failure to act is largely attributable to political leth-
argy. Once the searing images of Watts vanished from the nation's
conscience and Dr. King's prophetic and eloquent voice ceased to
ring, public interest shifted to different sorts of domestic woes,
including, most recently, the collapse of the savings and loan in-
dustry, tax reform and the destruction of the environment. Inter-
national maelstroms, such as the unending conflict in the Middle
166 National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
167 Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972);
Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (1968); Voting Rights Act of 1965,
Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78
Stat. 241 (1964).
16" Terrance Sandalow, Judicial Protection of MinOrities, 75 MICH. L. Rev, 1162, 1188
(1977).
159 J. Edmond Nathanson, Congressional Power to Contradict the Supreme Court's Constitutional
Decisions: Accommodations of Rights in Conflict, 27 Wm. & MARY L. Rev. 331, 360 (1986). See
also Gerald Gunther, Congressional Responses to Supreme Court Decisions: Distinguishing Consti-
tutionality and Wisdom, 18 STAN. L. REV. 24 (1983).
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East, the disintegration of the Communist Party in the Soviet bloc
countries and Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, seized the imagination of
the nation and Congress.
Congress's indifference can also be explained by a loss of con-
fidence. At the time of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964, 1965, and
1968 and the 1972 amendments, the legislative branch approached
racial isolation in the United States as a malady curable through
massive intervention. It fully anticipated eradicating discrimination
in employment, housing and voting through statutory fiat and vig-
orous enforcement by executive agencies and private attorneys gen-
eral. The end of discrimination would lead to economic advance-
ment in public and private sector employment and to full
participation in the body politic. That optimism now seems hope-
lessly naive. Today's Congress cannot escape the phenomenon of a
permanent underclass, devastated inner cities and families without
human capital to invest in the future. The Great Society has yet to
emerge. Congress and the nation, like Vladimir and Estragon, wait
numbly for Godot.
The complexity of these social ills cannot excuse Congress's
.
turning its back on them. Constructing a statute permitting race-
conscious preferences in state public works and employment is not
as politically dangerous as a first thought might suggest. Some
studies actually show widespread support for race-conscious pref-
erences, provided they are administered fairly and with notice. 170
A stumbling block to their implementation has long been the per-
ception that preferences owed their existence to pressure groups
and were adopted without input from those most likely to be af-
fected (i.e., white males) and in secret bargaining. Race-conscious
preferences authorized in the open by Congress and the states, with
ample opportunities for all interested parties to have their views
considered, will escape that criticism.
"" NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC, THE UNFINISHED AGENDA ON
RACE IN AMERICA ii—iv, 29 (1989). But see William R. Beer, Resolute Ignorance: Social Science
and Affirmative Action, 24 Soc'v 63 (May/June 1987); Frederick R. Lynch & William R. Beer,
"You Ain't the Right Color, Pal": White Resentment of Affirmative Action, 51 POLY REV. 64 (Winter
1990); Byron M. Roth, Social Psychology's "Racism," 98 Pun. INTEREST 26 (1990). See generally
Richard T. Schaefer, Racial Prejudice in a Capitalist State: What Has Happened to the American
Creed?, 47 NYLON 192 (1986) (analyzing changes in American attitudes toward race-related
issues in the United States since the publication of Gunnar Myrdal's An American Dilemma in
1944). Schaefer concludes that the recession and stagnant economy have played a significant
rule in shaping non-minority group members' negative attitude toward race-conscious pref-
erences. Id. at 198. See also W. Richard Merriman & Edward G. Carmines, The Limits of Liberal
Tolerance: The Case of Racial Policies, 20 Potyry 518 (1988).
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Uniformity will also lessen the perceived unfairness. Take the
case of two municipal agencies, B and D, that provide identical
services in adjacent counties. As it presently stands, A, an employee
of B Agency holding a position identical to C, an employee of D
Agency, may face radically different opportunities for advancement
depending on the private decision-making choices of her public
sector employer. Multiply the As and Cs of this country by the
millions of jobs subject to public sector affirmative action plans, and
it is easy to understand employees' frustration. The sensitivity of
race-conscious issues is not an excuse powerful enough to justify
delegating what are properly national issues of employment and
entrepreneurial policy to local decisionmakers.
Finally, the argument for race-conscious preferences in public
employment and contracting rests on two interrelated considera-
tions. First, public bureaucracies, no matter how fair and efficient,
cannot operate effectively if a significant segment of the citizenry
feels unrepresented and isolated from the decision-making pro-
cess.' 7 ' Minorities need to be employed in all state and municipal
agencies to give concrete evidence of representative government. It
is not enough, moreover, to have them clustered in jobs that prin-
cipally involve contact with the public. These jobs are often low-
level, civil service positions with limited input into administrative
decision making.' 72 Filling only these jobs with minority employees
smacks of tokenism and imports the structure of a plantation econ-
omy into state and municipal bureaucracies. Their presence in mid-
dle management positions gives witness to the value of representative
government. As Professor Lovell has argued:
[ljn the broadest sense, a public employee group repre-
sentative of the differing values and various perspectives
in our total society is essential to public accountability. Any
procedures which exclude multiple experience paths and
disparate values from organizations will in these terms
lower standards of public accountability as well as organi-
zational effectiveness.'"
Lit SAMUEL KRISLOV & DAVID H. ROSENBLOOM, REPRESENTATIVE BUREAUCRACY AND THE
AMERICAN POLITICAL Sv.s .rEm 32 (1981); Grace H. Saltzstein, Representative Bureaucracy and
Bureaucratic Responsibility: Problems and Prospects, 10 ADMIN. & SOO/ 465 (1979).
"2 For example, the percentage of minorities and women employed in federal govern-
ment agencies is directly related to the availability of blue-collar and clerical jobs within each
agency. J. Edward Kellough, Integration in the Public Workplace: Determinants of Minority and
Female Employment in Federal Agencies, 50 Pus. ADMIN. REV. 557, 561 (1990).
1 " Catherine Lovell, Three Key Issues in Affirmative Action, 34 Pun. ADMIN. REV. 235, 237
(1974).
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Minority members of the public perceive the administrative state as
acknowledging their existence in the body politic. Minority employ-
ees, especially those at decision-making levels, can advance the in-
terest of their community in shaping policy and expending funds.
It is a bedrock principle of public personnel management that the
racial and ethnic make-up of decisionmakers contributes to the
character and degree of a bureaucracy's social and political de-
mands.' 74
Second, race-conscious preferences in public employment and
contracting have succeeded in hastening the integration of minor-
ities into the economic mainstream. Public employment has histor-
ically provided mobility for disadvantaged groups turned away by
private employers.'" Much remains to be done to ensure inclusion
of minorities in the American free enterprise system. Building a
strong minority presence in the construction industry sends a very
visible, message to both the minority and non-minority communities
about the value of capitalism and the rewards of initiative, hard
work and self-employment. That the government is lending these
minority enterprises a helping hand does not detract from this
message. The government is always lending capitalism and free
enterprise a helping hand. How else do you explain capital gains
taxes as a friendly alternative to income taxes, accelerated depre-
ciation and research and development deductions—to name only a
few forms of governmental assistance?
While the statistics reflecting minority employment and entre-
preneurism are bleak, they do not on their own make the case for
race-conscious preferences. They will not cure the ills of families
headed by single women who live on the edge of, or below, the
poverty line; they will not make up for the informational and tech-
nological deficiencies of inner-city schools. What they can and will
do is boost the economic integration of minorities who already
possess work and marketplace skills." 6
 Critics have often charged
" 4 William R. McKinney, Public Personnel Selection; Issues and Choice Points, 16 PUB. PER-
SONNEL MGMT. 243, 254 (1987); Charles 14. Levine & Lloyd C. Nigro, The Public Personnel
System: Can Judicial Administration and Major Management Coexist?, 35 PuB. ADMIN. REV. 99
(1975).
"5 Id. See Brent S. Steel & Nicholas P. Lovrich, Jr., Equality and Efficiency Tradeoffs in
Affirmative Action—Real or Imagined? The Case of Women in Policing, 24 Soc. SC'. J. 51, 52
(1987).
116
 Studies evaluating race-conscious programs have documented their success in accel-
erating and solidifying the economic integration of minority group members. E.g., HAMMER-
MAN, supra note 62, at 5; EMPLOYMEN'I' STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPT OF LABOR,
EMPLOYMENT PATTERNS OF MINORI'T'IES AND WOMEN IN FEDERAL CONTRACTOR AND NON-
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that race-conscious preferences are flawed precisely for this reason.
That criticism misses the mark. Economic integration should not be
confused with the goal of reconstructing devastated inner cities or
routing the social pathologies that plague the underclass.
What affirmative action is not about is as important as what it
is about. Affirmative action is not a safety net. It is not designed to
improve the lot of the underclass or compensate for deficient ed-
ucational systems. It is about remedying societal discrimination in
employment, especially the subconscious race-premised expecta-
tions of employers and contractors. Its achievements become even
more meaningful in light of minority poverty, the social and eco-
nomic collapse of the inner cities, economic stagnation and the rise
of households headed by single females. Adverse treatment and
adverse impact have kept minorities at the margins of markets and
workplaces for generations. Race-conscious preferences propel
them toward the market and workplace centers. As a Rand Cor-
poration study commissioned by the Department of Labor ob-
served:
The essential purpose of affirmative action is to increase
the employment of blacks in jobs where they had previ-
ously been scarce. Since there is an abundance of blacks
in low-skill jobs, the main pressures will be concentrated
in the skilled jobs, where blacks had previously been
scarce. Thus, if there is a story to be told of effects of
affirmative action on relative wages of black men, its main
plot must be one of nonneutrality with respect to educa-
tion, with strong positive effects for college graduates and
CONTRACTOR ESTABLISHMENTS (1984): OFFICE OF FEDERAL CONTRACT COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS,
EMPLOYMENT PATTERNS OF MINORITIES AND WOMEN IN FEDERAL CONTRACTOR AND NON-
CONTRACTOR Es .rasusitmEnrrs, 1974-1980 37 (1984). See also Jonathan S. Leonard, The Impact
of Affirmative Action Regulation and Equal Employment Law on Black Employment, 4 J. ECON.
PERSPS. 47 (1990); William E. Feinberg, Are Affirmative Action and Economic Growth Alternative
Paths to Racial Equality?, 50 AM. Soc. REV. 561 (1985); Jonathan S. Leonard, What Was
Affirmative Action?, 76 Am. ECON. REV. 359 (1986). See generally ANDREW HACKER, Two
NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNEQUAL 107-33 (1992).
Raw numbers tell a powerful story. In 1962, IBM employed 750 African-Americans. As
a federal contractor, it was required to conduct underutilization reviews of its workforce and
implement a program of goals and timetables. By 1968, it had increased the number of black
employees almost tenfold, to 7,251. By 1980, the number had risen to 16,546. Even more
significant than the increase is that many IBM employees of color held middle-level mana-
gerial positions. Before the OFCCP adopted the Philadelphia Plan, fewer than 1% of the
construction workers in the Philadelphia area were minority group members. See supra notes
30, 62. By 1982, that number had increased to 12%. Robinson & Spitz, Affirmative Action:
Evolving Case Law and Shifting Philosophy, 10 URB. LEAGUE REV. 84,89 (1986-87).
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less strong, not necessarily positive, effects at lower edu-
cational levels.'"
B. Accelerating the Economic Integration of Minorities
The dramatic demographic shift that is occurring in employ-
ment in the United States is well documented. Economists have
even coined a term to describe it: "the browning of the labor force."
In 1986, the Department of Labor commissioned a study—Work-
force 2000—examining in detail the impact of demographics, ed-
ucation and economics in shaping America's workforce. 18 That
study brought the changing landscape of the nation's labor pool
into sharp relief. In 1990, white males constituted 47 percent of the
new entrants in the workforce. By the year 2000, that percentage
will drop to 30 percent.'" Within the present decade, Latinos will
make up 30 percent of the new entrants to the labor force; African-
Americans 17 percent and Asian Americans 11 percent.' 8° The
gender shift is equally dramatic. By 2000, 47 percent of the Amer-
ican labor force will be women. 18 ' Pointing to the aging of the Baby
Boom generation, the general decline in the birthrate over the last
twenty years, the higher birthrate among minority groups, and the
need for two wage earners to maintain the purchasing power of
middle class families,' 82
 the Department of Labor study warned the
public and private sector that they could no longer rely on laissez-
faire approaches to human capital. Business groups have acknowl-
edged the need for formidable affirmative action programs, includ-
ing race-conscious preferences, to ensure equality of achievement
in the workforce.'"
i" JAMES P. Swill & FINIS R. WELCH, CLOSING THE GAP: FORTY YEARS OF ECONOMIC
PROGRESS FOR BLACKs 93-94 (1986). Accord James P. Smith & Finis R. Welch, Black Economic
Progress Alter Myrdal, 27J. ECON. LIT. 519, 557 (1989).
' 7" HUDSON INSTITUTE, WORKFORCE 2000: WORK AND WORKERS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY (1987) thereinafter WORKFORCE 2000]. See also U.S. DEFT OF LABOR, INVESTING IN
PEOPLE: A STRATEGy To ADDRESS AMERICA'S WORKFORCE CRISIS (1989); GLASS CEILING, supra
note 13.
"9
 Lynne Duke, Cultural Shifts Bring Anxiety for White Men; Crowing Diversity Imposing New
Dynamic in Workplace, WASH. l'os'r, Jan. 1, 1991, at Al (citing Bureau of Labor Statistics).
180 The New Worker, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1990, (City Monthly Labor Review), at 3.
I "' WORKFORCE 2000, supra note 178, at 85-89.
182
 The study's findings include: in 1985, men and women ages 35-54 held 38% of the
jobs in the United States; by 2000 they will hold 51%. By the year 2000, there will be over
30 million new workers between ages 16-24; in 1980, there were 37.2 million such workers.
Because of higher birthrates, minorities will make up 33.2% of the nation's new workers
between 1988 and 2000. WORKFORCE 2000, supra note 178, at 78-82, 89-90.
183 E.g., Howard Gleclumm et al., Race in the Workplace, Bus. WK., July 8, 1991, at 50. As
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The need to cultivate the integration of minority group mem-
bers into the economic mainstream can hardly be disputed. While
the economic well-being of minority group members has improved
since the enactment of Title VII in 1964, they are far from full
participants in the workforce and entrepreneurial sectors of the
economy.' 84 In 1988, for example, the disparity between a typical
white family's income and a typical black family's income exceeded
that of the years 1969-1981. The disparity, moreover, is a shock-
ingly high 56.1 percent.'" The black unemployment rate remains
basically unchanged since 1978 and in 1987 ran as high as 2.45
times the rate for whites. That rate, moreover, fails to measure the
impact of the significant decrease in the participation rates for
blacks, particularly black men, in the lower range of the wage spec-
trum.'"
Almost one-third of all African-Americans live below the pov-
erty line. Less than 11 percent of whites do. The percentage of
African-Americans participating in the labor force has declined,
and unemployment has risen. Two sets of statistics offer a bleak
prognosis for ameliorating the poverty depicted by this data. First,
only 28 percent of recent black high school graduates are likely to
the Chairman of American Telephone & Telegraph Company observed, affirmative action
"is not just the right thing to do. It's a business necessity." Id. BUSINESS-HIGHER EDUCATION
Foams, cited in Sam Fullwood III, Broad Attack on Poverty Proposed, L.A. TIMES, June 6, 1990,
pt. A, at 14. See also Thlks on Affirmative Action Order for Federal Contractors Still Continuing,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), No. 243, A-1 (Dec. 18, 1985).
1" Bureau of Labor Statistics, Dep't of Labor, 37 Emrt.. & EARNINGS 183 ( Jan. 1990).
For a fuller analysis of these statistics, see Alfred W. Blumrosen, Society in Transition I: A
Broader Congressional Agenda for Equal Employment—The Peace Dividend, Leapfrogging, and Other
Matters, 8 YALE L. & Pot.'v RE:v. 257, 260-65 (1990); James J. Heckman & J. Houk Verkerke,
Racial Disparity and Employment Discrimination Law: An Economic Perspective, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 276, 281-82 (1990). See also FIACKF.R, supra note 177, at 93-106; SMITH & WELCH, supra
note 177, at 6; JUNE ONEILI„ U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL Rioters, THE ECONOMIC PROGRESS OF
BLACK MEN IN AMERICA 12 (1986); Cain, The Economic Analysis of Labor Market Discrimination:
A Survey, in I HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS (1986); John J. Donohue Ill & James
Heckman, Continuous Versus Episodic Change: The Impact of Civil Rights Policy on the Economic
Status of Blacks, 29 J. Ecox. LIT. 1603 (1991); Smith & Welch, supra note 177, at 522.
For an excellent review of the economic status of minorities and especially that of African-
Americans, see Robert E. Suggs, Rethinking Minority Business Development Strategies, 25 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. REV, 101 (1990). The author was alerted to much of the data identified in this
article in the Suggs piece.
185 CENTER FOR BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, STILL FAR FROM THE DREAM: RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN BLACK INCOME, EMPLOYMENT AND POVERTY 17 (1988) (hereinafter RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN BLACK INCOME]; Blumrosen, supra note 184, at 262 & n.26.
l" RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN BLACK INCOME, supra note 185, at 30-31; WORKFORCE 2000,
supra note 178, at 90; Blumrosen, supra note 184, at 262 & n.27; Heckman & Verkerke, supra
note 184, at 278 n.7.
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go on to college.'" Within that group the percentage of black males
attending college is declining.' 88
A high school diploma does not offer much hope for entry into
the middle class, much less wealth acquisition. Black youth are
increasingly locked into low-paying jobs despite a high school di-
ploma. Most high schools, especially those in inner cities, lack the
resources to prepare students for jobs. with prospects for advance-
ment. These jobs require computer literacy, competency in reason-
ing skills and proficiency in communication. In communities where
school financing depends on local property taxes for revenue, the
likelihood of education providing a vehicle to escape poverty-line
employment is dim.' 89 Viewed against the shrinking jobtmarket for
unskilled workers and employers' demand for technologically pro-
ficient workers, these statistics have ominous overtones.' 90
Second, the percentage of black children in families headed by
single women has now risen to a startling 43 percent.' 9 ' Because
these families are far more likely to live at or below the poverty
line, their chances of educational and occupational mobility are
restricted.
Employment without regard to the quality of employment is
no guarantor of economic success for minorities. The statistics are
sobering. The income of African-Americans has rarely exceeded
three-fifths that of Caucasians.' 92 The ratio of black incomes to
1A7 See Jason DeParle, Without Fanfare, Blacks March to Greater High School Success, N.Y.
TIMES, June 9, 1991, § I, at 1. Statistics show that in 1989 the dropout rate for blacks was
13.8%. In 1970, it was 27,9%. Id, at 26L. While the percentage of black students completing
high school is on the rise, that statistic merits less optimism than a first reading suggests. For
the reasons noted in the text, the actual monetary value of a high school diploma in terms
of potential earnings is much less in the 1990s than it was in the 1950s and 1960s.
I " id. What is also disturbing about this figure is that the absolute number of black males
going on to higher education is significantly smaller than the number of black females. In
1988, for example, 687,000 black women were enrolled in college, as compared with 443,000
black men, Id. See also HACKER, supra note 177 at 177-78.
' 89 See Michael M. Burns, Lessons from the Third World: Spirituality as the Source of Affirmative
Action, 14 VT. L. REV. 4(11, 401 n.2 (1990).
' 9° WORKFORCE 2000, supra note 178, at 91. Michael A. Lawrence, Technology and the
Workplace, 92 CRISIS 23, 38 (April 1985); John D. Kasarda, Urban Industrial Transition and the
Underclass, 501 ANNALS 26, 26-47 (1989); Robert M. Moruney & Jesse McClure, Social Welfare
and the Permanent Underclass, 19 URII. & Soc. CHANGE REV. 25 (1986). But see Norman
Fainstein, The Underclass/Mismatch Hypothesis as an Explanation for Black Economic Deprivation,
15 Pot_ & Soc. 403 (1986-87); Williams, Solving the Unemployment Problem: A Case for Full
Employment, 10 URS. LEAGUE REV. 25 (1986).
I "' WORKFORCE 2000, supra note 178, at 90.
192 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CENSUS OF POPULATION: GENERAL SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
CHARACTERISTICS, U.S. SUMMARY, PC 80.1-CI, tables 164, 170, 180 (1983).
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white incomes declined from 61.3 percent to 56.3 percent in the
years 1970-1983.'" 3
Even when white and black households have the same annual
income, the net worth of the black household is one-third that of
the white household." Investment profiles reveal a similar dispar-
ity. Less than 1 percent of black wealth is invested in stocks and
bonds compared to 7 percent of white wealth.' 95 Black wealth is
concentrated in equity in homes, cars and trucks (64.4 percent for
blacks versus 37.4 percent for whites). A much larger percentage
of white than black wealth holdings are placed in financial assets
(30.1 percent for whites versus 10.2 percent for blacks).' 96 The
explanation for the stark difference is not hard to plumb. Until
recently, society continued to engage in overt racial discrimination,
denying blacks a decent education,' 97 access to blue-collar jobs and
the professions, and occasions for the kinds of social networking
with whites that open up entrepreneurial opportunities. This lim-
ited or non-existent window of opportunity precluded blacks from
amassing capital that could be invested in stocks and bonds or
passed down from generation to generation.
The entrepreneurial participation of minorities is equally bleak.
Twelve out of every one hundred Americans is an African-Ameri-
can. Yet only 2 percent of all businesses are owned by African-
Americans. That 2 percent generates less than 2 percent of all
business receipts;' 98 those receipts represent less than 1 percent of
19]
	 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, Series P-60, No. 145,
Money Income and Poverty Status of Families and Persons in the United Stales: 1983, table 3 (1984).
i 94 Walter Updegrave, Race and Money, MONEY, Dec. 1989, at 152.
195
 A COMMON DESTINY: BLACKS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 291-94 (Gerald D. Jaynes &
Robin M. Williams, Jr. eds., 1989).
196 Henry S. Terrell, Wealth Accumulations of Black and White Families, 263. FIN. 363 (1971).
While this data is over 20 years old, it is consistent with more recent statistical studies. See
TIMOTHY BATES, MAJOR STUDIES OF MINORITY BUSINESSES: A BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY ( Joint
Center for Political and Economic Studies ed., 1990) (on file with the author).
197 Schools that serve minority group children are notoriously underfunded in terms of
per pupil expenditures in comparison to schools that serve majority group children. In San
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), the Supreme Court refused (1)
to characterize the right to education as fundamental for equal protection purposes and (2)
to subject unequal funding with a disproportionate effect on minorities to a heightened
degree of scrutiny. Challenges under state constitutions have proved far more successful.
Approximately 24 state courts have declared unequal funding a violation of their state
constitutions. Jack Y. Perry, Financing Education in Minnesota: Equality and Constitutional Ques-
tions Raised by State Referendum Levy, 8 L. & INN. J. 229, 235 n,25 (1989).
195 ROBERT E. SUGGS, RECENT CHANGES IN BLACK-OWNED BUSINESSES 2, 6 ( Joint Center
for Political Studies, Washington, D.C. 1986). See also P. BEARSE, AN ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS
OF MINORITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP (U.S. Dept of Commerce Minority Business Development
Agency 1983).
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the nation's business revenues.'" While minority business enter-
prises number approximately 800,000, only 14 percent have paid
employees. 200
The very limited success of minorities in the entrepreneurial
sector is directly linked to the disparity in net worth of minority
households, especially those of African-Americans. A principle ob-
stacle to the health and growth of minority enterprises is their lack
of access to capital. The major determinant of success in analyzing
white and black enterprises is the availability of initial investment
capita1.20 ' Obviously, access to capital is considerably limited by both
the size and form of personal wealth holdings. The absence of
accessible capital explains in large measure the concentration of
blacks in industries that require minimal capital contributions.
Lastly, personal wealth holdings limit established MBEs to industries
that operate with little capital; the absence of assets makes the MBEs
unattractive loan applicants to commercial banks. Cut off from
capital, MBEs can neither weather economic storms nor take ad-
vantage of new opportunities. 202
There is an important link between MBEs and minority em-
ployment. Repeatedly, studies have shown that almost all employees
of MBEs are minority group members. 2" This is true irrespective
of the MBE's location in a minority community. Businesses owned
by non-minorities but located in minority communities employ a
larger percentage of non-minorities than minorities.2"
Two other factors deserve mention in considering the relative
weaknesses of MBEs vis-a-vis non-minority enterprises. The Civil
Rights movement of the 1960s and 1970s, braced by legislative and
judicial activism, enabled a significant number of middle-class mi-
norities to escape from racially isolated neighborhoods and racially
stratified job categories. Their progress, with its attendant flight of
122 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1982 SURVEY OF MINORITY OWNED BUSINESS ENTERPRISES
MB82-1, MB82.2, MB82.3 (1985-1986).
20  U.S. BUREAU OF 'DIE CENSUS, 1977 SURVEY OF MINORITY OWNED BUSINESS ENTERPRISES
MB77-1, MB77-2, MB77-3 (1979-1980); U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1982 SURVEY OF
MINORITY OWNED BUSINESS ENTERPRISES MB82-1, MB82-2, MB82-3 (1985-1987).
2" TIMOTHY BATES, THE ROLE OF BLACK ENTERPRISE IN URIIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
(,Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies ed., 1990). See Diana B. Henriques, Piercing
Wall Street's 'Lucite Ceiling,' N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11,1991, § 3, at 6.
202 Helen Bradford, Wealth, Assets and Income in Black Households, AFRO-AMERICAN STuniEs
PROGRAM, UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND (Feb. 1990) (working paper on file with the author).
2" BATEs, supra note '201; Timothy M. Bates, Do Black-Owned Businesses Employ Minority
Workers? New Evidence, 16 REV. BLACK POL. ECON. 51 (1988).
20'
	 SUpro note 201.
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capital, had a negative impact on MBEs and the availability of jobs
for unskilled minority workers. 205
 The concentration of blacks in
blue-collar manufacturing jobs and in unskilled jobs in general
made them particularly vulnerable to job shrinkages caused by the
restructuring of the United States economy in response to global
competition.2°6
 Furthermore, the recession in the late 1980s and
early 1990s hit minority communities more harshly than non-mi-
nority communities, contributing significantly to drying up the al-
ready limited pool of capital. The failure of the savings and loan
industry only made matters worse. 207
C. Recognizing Racism in the Work and Market Places
What Congress needs to emphasize is the link between racial
status and racial economic inequality. While most Americans are
sympathetic to the notion of legal redress for personalized claims
of discrimination and support outlawing discriminatory treatment,
individualism still occupies a revered spot in the nation's conscious-
ness. The stronger the belief in individualism, the easier it is to
attribute the poor economic status of minorities to a "lack of effort,"
"indolence," "welfare dependence," and so forth. 208
 From this per-
spective, culture, institutional barriers and societal expectations 209
205
 Creigs C. Beverly & Howard J. Stanback, The Black Underclass Theory and Reality, 17
BLACK SCHOLAR 24 (Sept./Oct. 1986); Sheldon Danziger & Peter Gottschalk, Earnings Inequal-
ity, the Spatial Concentration of Poverty and the Underclass, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 211 (1987). See
also James E. Ellis, The Black Middle Class, Bus. Wx., Mar. 14, 1988, at 62.
"6
 Peter Passel!, Why Black Men Have Lost Ground, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1991, at D2. See
also Williams, supra note 190.
207 John D. Abell, The Impact of Demand Management Policies on Black vs. White Employment,
18 REY. BLACK POL. ECON. 43, 57-58 (1989).
20" Livingston, supra note 107, at 99-100. See also HOWARD SCHUMAN ET AL, RACIAL
ATTITUDES IN AMERICA: TRENDS AND INTERPRETATIONS (1985); James R. Kluegel & Eliot R.
Smith, Whites' Beliefs About Blacks' Opportunity, 47 AM. Soc. Ray. 518 (1982); Address by John
E. Jacob, National Urban League Annual Conference ( July 21, 1991), reprinted in VITAL
SPEECHES OF THE DAY 58-63 (1992).
2'16
 See Jeff Howard & Ray Hammond, Rumors of Inferiority, in RACIAL PREFERENCE AND
RACIAL. JusTicE: THE NEW AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CONTROVERSY 369 (Russell Nieli ed., 1991).
See also WILLIAM BRINK & LOUIS HARRIS, BLACK & WHITE (1976); ANGUS CAMPBELL, WHITE
ATTITUDES TOWARD BLACK PEOPLE (1971).
The legal literature exploring unconscious racism is incredibly rich. E.g., Richard Del-
gado, When a Story is Just a Story: Does Voice Really Matter?, 76 VA. L. REV. 95 (1990); Charles
R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39
STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987). Mari I. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law
and a Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329 (1991); Thomas Ross,
Innocence and Affirmative Action, 43 VAND. L. REV. 297 (1990); Patricia Williams, The Obliging
Shell: An Informal Essay on Formal Equal Opportunity, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2128 (1989).
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are unobserved forces. What Congress needs to do is make the
invisible visible. 210
Social science literature and behavioral management studies
point the way. Among the most pertinent findings are those dem-
onstrating the critical role of race in the choice of occupation and
in the selection of competing applicants for jobs."' Fortune 500
and 1000 companies often responded to the need for integrating
middle management by channeling African-Americans into person-
nel and public relations jobs. 212 Although highly visible, these po-
sitions frequently cluster at the edge of an organization's power
structure and are rarely rungs to positions of prestige and influence
along the corporate ladder. 213 African-Americans experience more
difficulty than their white peers in finding and maintaining men-
toring relationships, which are invaluable tools for advancement in
public and private sector organizations. 214 Mentors provide career
guidance specific to the organization and critical psychological sup-
port. 215 The absence of African-Americans at high levels within
organizations tends to make it especially difficult for other African-
Americans to enter into the kinds of mentoring relationships that
make the critical difference in advancement. While cross-race men-
toring occurs, it is simply not as effective as same-race mentoring. 216
African-Americans are also particularly vulnerable to the vicissi-
2,0 For an illuminating study of the relationship between the ethic of individualism and
non-minority opposition to race-conscious preferences, see James R. Kluegel, "If There Isn't
a Problem, You Don't Need a Solution": The Bases of Contemporary Affirmative Action Attitudes, 28
AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 761 (1985). Professor Kluegel specifically concludes: "[T]here is
a need to extend whites' sense of the problem to include an understanding of how class
conditions and other structural forces may limit chances for economic advancement, and
thereby to escape the narrowness of defining the problem as involving only individually
protected racial discrimination." Id. at 780. See also Kluegel & Smith, supra note 208.
2 " Andrew M. Gill, The Role of Discrimination in Determining Occupational Structure, 42
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 610 (1989).
212 Howard Gleckman et al., Race in the Workplace, Bus. Wx., July 8, 1991, at 50. This
section of the text specifically describes the experience of African-Americans in the workplace
to the exclusion of members of other racial groups. The pertinent organizational behavior
studies focus almost exclusively on African-Americans. Research is critically needed with
respect to other minorities, especially Latinos. Thomas & Alderfer, The Influence of Race on
Career Dynamics: Theory and Research on Minority Career Choices, in HANDBOOK OF CAREER
THEORY 133, 134, 151 (Michael Arthur et al. eds., 1989).
21 Sharon M. Collins, The Marginalization of Black Executives, 36 Soc. PROBS. 317 (1989).
2 ' 4 FLOYD DICKENS, JR. & JACQUELINE B. DICKENS, THE BLACK MANAGER: MAKING IT IN
THE CORPORATE WORLD 307-10 (1982); DANIEL R. LEVINSON ET AL., THE SEASONS OF A MAN'S
LIFE (1978); Karmel, Why Blacks Still Haven't Made It on Wall Street, Am. LAW., Apr. 1984, at
1. But see Thomas & Alderfer, supra note 212, at 141.
215 Thomas & Alderfer, supra note 212, at 141.
416 Id. at 143.
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tudes of recessionary market conditions and corporate restructur-
ings. 217
Subtle, unconscious discrimination affects not only what jobs
minorities hold but also how they are judged in those jobs. Non-
minorities frequently evaluate minority workers on their ability to
"fit in" rather than their competence. 218
 Studies show that minorities
are frequently subject to a dual set of performance standards. Their
color inevitably puts them at a disadvantage regardless of the de-
cisionmaker's intent not to discriminate. For example, supervisors
frequently rate African-Americans more harshly on job perfor-
mance evaluations, especially if the supervisors are white. 21° Cus-
tomers also discriminate, preferring white to black employees.220
Black males are often more harshly judged than black females. 221
The influence of race on promotion criteria is particularly striking.
Predominantly white-male selection committees tend to ignore the
racial and ethnic diversity of the workforce that the promoted em-
ployee will supervise, whereas racially balanced committees pay
close attention to this factor. 222
Minorities in the academic world often fare no better than their
peers in the corporate world. They too suffer from marginalization
and isolation from decision-making units and are judged more
harshly. 223
 One major study compared the hiring patterns of uni-
217 Norman Riley, Attitudes of the New Black Middle Class, 94 CRISIS 14, 18, 31-32 (Dec.
1986).
21"
 GEORGE DAVIS & GLEGG WATSON, BLACK LIFE IN CORPORATE AMERICA: SWIMMING IN
THE MAINSTREAM (1982); DICKENS & DICKENS, supra note 214; Dale Belman & John S.
Heywood, Incentive Schemes and Racial Wage Discrimination, 17 REV. BLACK POL. ECON. 47, 47-
49 (1988).
2 ' 9 Jeffrey H. Greenhaus et al., Effects of Race on Organizational Experiences, Job Performance
Evaluations, and Career Outcomes, 33 ACAD. MGMT. J. 64-86 (1990); Richard Hudson, Nonsense
Clouds Affirmative Action Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1991, at A16 (letter to the editor). The
same is also true for women. GLASS CEILING, supra note 13, at 15.
220 George J. Borjas & Stephen G. Bronars, Consumer Discrimination and Self-Employment,
97 J. POL. ECON. 581 (1989); Belman & Heywood, supra note 218.
22)
 Cf. Felicia Kessel, Black Men and Women in the Corporate Playground: Is the Competition
Real?, 94 CRISIS 19, 23 (Apr./May 1987).
222 Clayton Alderfer & R.C. Tucker, Measuring Managerial Potential and Intervening to
Improve the Racial Equity of Upward Mobility Decisions, Technical Report No. 6, Yale Sch. of
Org. and Mgmt.
225
 Talmadge Anderson, Black Encounters of Racism and Elitism in White Academe: A Critique
of the System, 181 BLACK STUD. 259 (1988). For trenchant discussions of racism encountered
by minority law professors, see Derrick Bell, Strangers in Academic Paradise: Law Teachers of
Color in Still White Law Schools, 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 385 (1986); Andrew W. Haines, Minority
Law Professors and the Myth of Sisyphus: Consciousness and Praxis Within the Special Teaching
Challenge in American Law Schools, 10 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 247 (1988); Randall L. Kennedy,
Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1745 (1989). See also Richard Delgado,
Rodrigo's Chronicle, 101 YALE L.J. 1357 (1992). Objections to race- and gender-conscious
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versity search committees. 224 It showed that committees with more
than token female representation made a greater number of offers
to female candidates than committees with few or no female rep-
resentatives. Two observations stand out: first, the study challenges
the assumption that affirmative action considerations propel de-
partments with few women to hire more; and second, it solidly
supports the proposition that "the presence of moderate numbers
of women influences hiring decisions that promote women's oppor-
tunities."225 The observations' transference to minority hiring in the
academic world presents no difficulty. The observations, moreover,
are entirely consistent with patterns of decision making in the cor-
porate and business environment. 22"
Arguing for race-conscious preferences is not the same as ar-
guing for non-merit hiring and promotions. Adding race as a con-
sideration to the employer's or contracting authority's decision-mak-
ing calculus is simply to recognize that membership in a racially
identifiable group inevitably puts employees and entrepreneurs at
a disadvantage. Racial preferences help to level the playing field by
making up for dysfunctional mentoring relationships, more severe
evaluation systems and biased customer selections.
In short, affirmative action plans, if properly constructed, make
good economic sense for the nation. By correcting for unconscious
racism they will accelerate the entry of minority group members
into the middle class and solidify the place of those who are already
there. They will stimulate the growth of MBEs which, in turn, will
result in greater labor force participation by minorities. 227
preferences in the academic world spring from the same well of individualisin and meritoc-
racy as do the objections raised in the corporate and business community. Witt, Affirmative
Action and fob Satisfaction: Self-Interested v. Public. Spirited Perspectives on Social Equity—Some
Sobering Findings from the Academic Workplace, 10 REV. PERSONNEL ADMIN. 73,74-77 (1990).
224
 Yoder et al., The Power of Numbers in Influencing Hiring Decisions, 3 GENDER & Soc. 269
(1989).
V25 Id.
ti6 See supra notes 209-22 and accompanying text.
"7
 Some critics of affirmative action question its success and contend that race-conscious
programs have actually narrowed avenues of economic opportunity for minorities. Thomas
Sowell, a black conservative economist, has been a particularly vocal opponent. THOMAS
SOWELL, CIVIL RIGHTS: RHETORIC OF REALITY? (1984); THOMAS SOWELL, THE ECONOMICS AND
POLITICS OF RACE: AN INTERNATIONAL. PERSPECTIVE (1983); THOMAS SOWELL, ETHNIC AMER-
ICA: A HIs'roRY (1981); THOMAS SOWELL, MARKETS AND MINORITIES (1981); Thomas Sowell,
Are Quotas Good for Blacks?, 65 COMMENTARY 39 ( June 1978). See also Smith & Welch, supra
note 177, at 555. See generally WILLIAM J. WILSON, THE DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE:
BLACKS AND CHANGING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS (2d ed. 1980); Christopher Jencks, Affirmative
Action for Blacks: Past, Present, and Future, 28 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 731 (1985).
Other black critics base their objection on the stigma of being an affirmative action
beneficiary. E.g., Shelby Steele, A Negative Vote on Affirmative Action, N.Y. TIMES, May 13,
1990, § 6 (Magazine), at 46. See also infra notes 272-73.
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D. The Court, Diversification and Constitutional Values
The preceding arguments directly address the employment and
entrepreneurial benefits of race-conscious preferences. Such pref-
erences also provide a benefit of a different dimension: diversifi-
cation in the work and market places. Objectors to race-conscious
preferences will immediately protest, "There is no such thing as a
`minority' viewpoint." Congress rejected precisely that protest, how-
ever, in the legislative scheme upheld in Metro Broadcasting. The
experience of being an African-American, a Latino or an Asian-
American mediates an individual's consciousness in a way that is
simply unknowable to non-minorities. 228
 The experience of racial
separateness is present regardless of the individual's education, so-
cial status or financial well-being. Like gender it is a constant of
being. Admittedly, some minorities experience their race more in-
tensely than others. That psychological reality does not detract from
their presence as an agency of diversity.
Complete acceptance of diversity as a constitutional value ad-
equate to justify race-conscious preferences is not yet a fait accompli.
The Court's initial hostility toward diversity justifications is dimin-
ishing, however. Judicial acceptance depends upon factors resem-
bling the ones noted earlier: the identity of the implementing body
within the federal structure and the justificatory purpose. Signifi-
cantly, the Court favors congressionally mandated diversity.
The Court's original attitude toward race-conscious preferences
based on a diversity justification reflected a deep-seated suspicion
and antagonism. Wary of government attempts at social engineer-
ing, the Court rejected justifications based on role-modeling229 and
societal discrimination. 230
 The Court questioned whether "diversity"
in employment and in contracting was anything more than an at-
tempt to distribute economic opportunities along racial lines. Pro-
moting different perspectives and new ways of analyzing familiar
data simply did not seem to be pertinent considerations in an em-
ployer's calculus of hiring and promotion values. Nor did a public
contracting authority's desire to eradicate entrepreneurial isolation
for racially identifiable groups satisfy the Court's scrutiny.
2213 See the legal literature cited supra note 209.
229
 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 275-76 (1986); id. at 288 n.* (O'Con-
nor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
299
 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 496-97 (1989); Wygant, 476 U.S.
at 274, 276; id. at 288 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and in the judgment).
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On occasion, however, the Court sub silencio recognized diversity
as a legitimate goal of government. Some of these cases specifically
concerned equal protection; others did not. Justice Powell's decision
in Bakke turned on his perception that ethnic and racial diversity in
the college classroom promoted greater self-knowledge which, in
turn, benefited society as a whole."' Diversity also played a role in
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan. 232
 Justice O'Connor's ma-
jority opinion viewed with extreme skepticism the all-female school
of nursing's claim that the presence of male students would retard
the development of leadership capacities in women.
The Court's tacit support for diversity was not confined to
professional training. In Johnson v. Transportation Agency, a Title VII
affirmative action case, the Court acknowledged the harassment and
lack of support Ms. Joyce had received at the hands of the all-male
workforce, which resented her employment in jobs traditionally
held by men.23 The Court acknowledged that diversity served not
only to guarantee that different voices were heard in the workplace;
diversity also served as a watchdog to guard against those who would
silence different voices.
The Court's reluctance to embrace a diversity justification
wholeheartedly was severely criticized by Justice Stevens and by the
academic community. 234 In Metro Broadcasting, Inc., the Court finally
responded to the criticism, and "diversity" entered the constitutional
lexicon as an acceptable synonym for remediation, at least where
Congress is implementing authority.
In Metro Broadcasting, Inc., diversity carried with it legal baggage
not present in the earlier cases. In that case, the Court confronted
two sets of race-conscious preferences against the backdrop of a
well-established First Amendment jurisprudence allowing the FCC
considerable freedom to promote diversity of viewpoint. Because
of spectrum scarcity, the Court had long acknowledged the FCC's
right to impose criteria in awarding broadcast licenses which would
certainly offend the free speech clause of the First Amendment had
the government applied them to the print media." 5 Central to the
2" Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 314 (1978). The link between Powell's
opinion and republican civic virtue needs to be explored in greater detail. See Derrick Bell
& Preeta Bansal, The Republican Revival and Racial Politics, 97 YALE L.J. 1609 (1988).
"2 458 U.S. 718, 730 n.16 (1982).
2" 480 U.S. 616, 624 n.5 (1987).
'" See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 313-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Sullivan, supra note 82.
2" Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); National Broadcasting
Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 215 (1943). See also FCC v. League or Women Voters of
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Court's jurisprudence was the right of the public to receive "a bal-
anced presentation of information on issues of public importance
that otherwise might not be addressed if control of the medium
were left entirely in the hands of those who own and operate
broadcasting stations."2"
Extending the diversity rationale of Bakke, Hogan, Johnson and
Metro Broadcasting to public contracting and even state and munic-
ipal employment is not an impossible task. Private and public sector
employers and contracting officials have championed the diversity
rationale for years.237 They have recognized that a racially mixed
workforce offers a more balanced perspective on internal operating
procedures and on customer and client needs. The "browning" of
the United States labor force and the new challenge of a truly global
marketplace more than constitutionally justify Congress's permit-
ting the states to adopt race-conscious affirmative action plans.
The Court has endorsed diversity as a constitutional value with
respect to other provisions as well. While these cases are obviously
distinguishable, they offer additional support for the arguments
advanced in this article, particularly because they address market-
place issues. Diversity in the marketplace is a core value in much of
the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Since Gibbons v. Og-
den, 238
 the Court has assiduously sought to promote the nation as
one economic unit, scrupulously striking down efforts by the states
to restrict access to goods and natural resources to their own resi-
dents. 239
 Despite the Court's devotion to the concept of a national
common market unimpeded by state rivalries and jealousies, it has
carved out the market participant exception to the Commerce
Clause, that allows the states under certain circumstances to insulate
their residents from the vicissitudes of the forces of supply and
demand. The market participant exception to the Commerce Clause
permits the states to enter into the hurly-burly of the capitalist
system by activities as diverse as building cement plants and pur-
Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 377 (1984); FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S.
775, 795 (1978); Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94,
122 (1973). See generally TRIBE, supra note 138, §.$ 12-25, at 998-1010.
256
 Red Lion Broadcasting Co., 395 U.S. at 390.
252 See supra notes 56-68 and accompanying text.
2" 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
2" E.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979) (minnows); Philadelphia v. New Jersey,
437 U.S. 617 (1978) (landfill sites); H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Dumond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949)
(milk); Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. I (1928) (shrimp). c f. Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (cantaloupes).
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chasing hulks of abandoned automobiles. 240 The market participant
exception allows the states to experiment with different economic
models to stimulate growth. Direct intervention in the marketplace
stands side by side with regulation and taxation as tools for eco-
nomic development.
The Court's rationale in Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 24 ' one of the lead-
ing market participant cases, argues for precisely the same degree
of local control over expenditures as proposed in this article. The
state is the "guardian and trustee for its people." 242
 It "may fairly
claim some measure of sovereign interest in retaining freedom to
decide how, and with whom and for whose benefit to deal." 245
 What
the Court so freely acknowledges in its market participant jurispru-
dence it should acknowledge as well in reviewing race-conscious
preferences. The same "healthy regard for federalism," respect for
"a state's ability to structure relations exclusively with its own citi-
zens," and preference for "solving local problems and distributing
government largesse" 244
 at immediate levels of government should
support state efforts to insure racial diversity in employment and
the marketplace.
Reeves, Inc. also addresses another argument made in this ar-
ticle, the value of Congressional policy making over judicial decision
making. Acknowledging the "competing considerations . . . subtle,
complex, politically charged, and difficult to assess," it concluded
"the adjustments of interests in this context is a task better suited
for Congress than this Court."245
 No different rule should apply if
Congress enacts a statute permitting the states to adopt race-con-
scious preferences in employment and public contracting.
Closely linked to the market participant exception is the Court's
Article IV jurisprudence. 246 In analyzing the restraints imposed on
state regulation by the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Court
has not been unsympathetic to the efforts of the inner cities in their
public works appropriations to foster the employment of, and skills
2" Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980) (state-owned and operated cement plant);
Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976) (state purchasing of crushed car
frames),
41
 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
542 Id. at 438.
2" Id. at 438 n.10.
244 Id. al 441.
246 Id. at 439.
246
 The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV provides: "The citizens of each
state shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." U.S.
CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
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training for, their residents. 247 Local and state officials have long
recognized that building and repairing an infrastructure accom-
plishes very little unless accompanied by a significant investment in
human capital. In permitting officials to insist that local residents
be hired on public works projects, the Court has approved state-
mandated diversity in construction-related employment. As is the
case with its market participant jurisprudence, the Court, in ana-
lyzing the restraints of Article IV, genuflects before the altar of
federalism. "Every inquiry under the Privileges and Immunities
Clause 'must . . . be conducted with due regard for the principle
that the States should have considerable leeway in analyzing local
evils and in prescribing appropriate cures.' . . . This caution is
particularly appropriate when a government body is merely setting
conditions on the expenditure of funds it controls. "248
Diversity is at the heart of First Amendment freedom of asso-
ciation cases in marketplace contexts. The Court has displayed acute
sensitivity to state and local efforts to break down admission barriers
that have kept women and minorities from full access to business
opportunities. These barriers, frequently resting on stereotypical
assumptions, have constantly deprived women and minorities of
occasions to meet potential clients, customers, colleagues and inves-
tors in social settings. In unlocking the clubhouse doors, the Court
has unmistakably given state and municipal officials a powerful tool
to promote diversity in social settings which will in turn facilitate
economic advancement. Organizations such as Rotary Clubs, the
Jaycees and local business clubs can no longer protect themselves
from claims of economic equality by hiding behind a First Amend-
ment shield of freedom of association. 249 The Court has boldly
rejected their claims of constitutional protection, emphasiiing the
state's interest in ensuring diversity in the marketplace.
The commercial free speech cases of the First Amendment also
betray a bias in favor of diversity in the marketplace. When the
"' United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208 (1984).
Where the Court has been unsympathetic, it has been because of a statute's too sweeping
reach. E.g., Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978). The Court's concern for the reach of
the legislation resembles its concern in affirmative action cases that the race-conscious pref-
erences benefit members of those minority groups likely to have been targets of discrimination
be tied to the percentage of qualified minority group members in the local labor pool, and
not trammel the interests of "innocent" white males.
248 465 U.S. at 222-23.
249 E.g., New York State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of N.Y., 487 U.S. I (1988); Board of
Directors of Rotary Intl v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987); Roberts v. United
States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
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Court strikes down state laws that restrict advertising by pharmacies
or prohibit promoting one form of energy use over another, the
ultimate result opens up the channels of communication for differ-
ent voices (e.g., chain drugstores versus "morn and pop" drugstores;
chain drugstores and "mom and pop" drugstores versus madhouse
drug distributors; gas utilities versus electric utilities; nuclear utili-
ties versus gas and electric utilities; conservationists versus energy
expansionists). 25° The Court has always espoused the notion that
"the best means ... is to open the channels of communications,
rather than to close them." 251 Thus, the Court has vigilantly applied
the protection of the First Amendment to advertisements by law-
yers, encouraging diversity in describing services and charging for
them.252 It has been singularly unreceptive to the invocation of
dignity as an anti-diversity concept to block exchanges of commer-
cial communication between lawyers and their potential clients. 255
Assuring diversity of voices and limiting government attempts
to silence particular voices are important themes in First Amend-
ment cases involving campaign financing as well. The Court has not
hesitated to strike down national, state and local legislation if it
curtailed speakers' ability to make their views known on matters of
political controversy. 254 It has refused to allow the states to frustrate
the voices of advocacy groups under the guise of protecting the
public from fraudulent solicitations for charitable organizations. 255
Finally, it has protected diversity of views by denying government
attempts to prohibit the expression of, or force delivery of, views
inconsistent with the speaker's perspectives. 256
V. A PROPOSAL FOR CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
Critics of affirmative action have often argued that programs
designed to compensate for "disadvantage" will achieve the same
25" Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980)
(utility promotion of electrical energy); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (advertising of prescription drug prices).
251 Central Hudson Gas F.? Eke. Corp., 447 U.S. at 562; Virginia State Bd, of Pharmacy, 425
U.S. at 770.
"2 in re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
255
 Zander v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626,647-48 (1985).
2"
 FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480 (1985); Citizens
Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 75 (1978); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
255
 Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
256 Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986); Central Hudson
Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980); Consolidated Edison Co. of
N.Y., Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
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results without government endorsement of allocations along racial
lines. Justice Scalia is a proponent of such a solution.
I do not, on the other hand, oppose—indeed, I strongly
favor—what might be called . . . 'affirmative action pro-
grams' of many types of help for the poor and disadvan-
taged. It may well be that many, or even most, of those
benefitted . . . would be members of minority races. . . . I
would not care if all of them were. 257
Justice Scalia's solution is attractive for two reasons. First, it
sends a clear message that race is irrelevant in the marketplace.
Second, it takes the public sector out of the "race business." No
weary hours must be spent in determining whether a construction
company whose owner's great-great-grandmother was one-quarter
Native American and one-quarter Guatemalan qualifies as a minor-
ity business enterprise, or whether a preference benefiting "His-
panics" includes descents of Portuguese immigrants who lived in
Brazil for only three years before immigrating to the United
States. 258
 Of course, other weary hours may have to be spent deter-
mining whether the "disAdvantaged" companies claiming the pref-
erences truly fit the criteria (whatever they may be) and are not
"fronts." Proving disadvantage can be complicated. 259
Justice Scalia's solution, however, smacks of the ostrich-in-the-
sand syndrome of constitutional interpretation. It requires the
2" Scalia, supra note 47, at 156. He reiterated this view in City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson, Co„ 488 U.S. 469, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). In this regard
Justice Scalia may be the intellectual heir of Justice Douglas. In dissenting from the majority's
dismissal on mootness grounds of the very first affirmative action plan to reach the Court,
Justice Douglas argued against exclusive racial preferences. He favored "evaluating an ap-
plicant's prior achievements in light of the barriers that he had to overcome." DeFunis v.
Odegaard, 916 U.S. 312, 331 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
The concept of race-neutral affirmative action programs conditioned on economic de-
privation has gained political support in recent years. See Steven A. Holmes, Mulling the Idea
of Affirmative Action for Poor Whites, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1991, E, at 3; Don Wycliff, Blacks
Debate the Costs of Affirmative Action, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1990, § 4, at 3. See also Richard
Delgado, Commentary: Zero-Based Racial Politics: An Evaluation of Three Best-Case Arguments on
Behalf of the Nonwhite Underclass, 78 GEO. L.J. 1929 (1990).
The Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987 combines
an "economically and socially disadvantaged" model with a race-conscious model by creating
a rebuttable presumption that members of certain designated minorities are socially and
economically disadvantaged. See supra notes 157-62 and accompanying text. It is highly
doubtful that Justice Scalia would find the statute's racially determined rebuttable presump-
tion consistent with the mandates of the equal protection component of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
255
	 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 534 n.5 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
259 See supra note 159.
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courts to ignore a legislature's or agency's overriding motivation to
benefit minorities or women at the expense of whites and males
and the masking of that intent in the language of "disadvantage." 260
While the norms enunciated in Washington v. Davis26 ' and Personnel
Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney 2"2
 may protect such a statute
against constitutional challenge, 2" the Supreme Court should not
encourage government deception. Certainly, the Court does not
look favorably on facially neutral legislation enacted to disadvantage
minorities. 264
 Interestingly, the Association of General Contractors,
which has challenged many MBE programs, also disapproves pro-
grams designed to aid small businesses irrespective of their owner's
race or gender. 2"
This article will not argue for the moral imperative of affir-
mative action. That brief has been well and eloquently argued by
others. 2" In the words of Justice Marshall:
The position of the Negro today in America is the tragic
but inevitable consequence of centuries of unequal treat-
ment. Measured by any benchmark of comfort or achieve-
ment, meaningful equality remains a distant dream for
the Negro.
A Negro child today has a life expectancy which is
shorter by more than five years than that of a white child.
260
 For example, one commentator has noted, "Ifilexible procurement goals that put
forth goals for assisting disadvantaged businesses, of course, can be effective minority business
set-aside programs only if they are administered by procurement officials that truly want to
assist minority-owned firms. - BATES, supra note I 96, at 101 (emphasis in the original).
261 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
262
 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
263 In Washington v. Davis, the Court held that a facially neutral statute that had a disparate
impact on minority group members did not violate the equal protection component of the
Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause in the absence of purposeful intent on the part of
the legislature to disadvantage them. 426 U.S. at 246-47. In Feeney, the Court made a
constitutional challenge to a facially neutral statute even more difficult by adopting a "'because
of,' not merely in spite of"' standard, 442 U.S. at 279.
261
 Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985). For Justice Scalia, the intent question,
at least as it relates to legislation, is simply not an issue at all. Justice Scalia has long argued
that legislative intent is essentially unknowable and its manifestation in committee reports
and speeches unreliable due to ease of political manipulation. E.g., Blanchard v. Bergeron,
489 U.S. 87, 98-99 (1989). (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
See also H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 251-56 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
265
 Michael deCourcy Hinds, Minority Business Set Back Sharply by Court's Rulings, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 23, 1991, at A 15.
266
 E.g., Roy L. Brooks, The Affirmative Action Issue; Law, Policy, and Morality, 22 CONN. L.
REV. 323, 351-72 (1990). Sullivan, supra note 82. See also Joel J. Kupperman, Relations Between
the Sexes: Timely vs. Timeless Principles, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV, 1027 (1988).
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The Negro child's mother is over three times more likely
to die of complications in childbirth, and the infant mor-
tality rate for Negroes is nearly twice that for whites. The
median income of the Negro family is only 60% that of
the median of a white family, and the percentage of Ne-
groes who live in families with incomes below the poverty
line is nearly four times greater than that of whites.
When the Negro child reaches working age, he finds
that America offers him significantly less than it offers his
white counterpart. For Negro adults, the unemployment
rate is twice that of whites, and the unemployment rate
for Negro teenagers is nearly three times that of white
teenagers. A Negro male who completes four years of
college can expect a median annual income of merely $110
more than a white male who has only a high school di-
ploma. Although Negroes represent 11.5% of the popu-
lation, they are only 1.2% of the lawyers and judges, 2%
of the physicians, 2.3% of the dentists, 1.1% of the engi-
neers and 2.6% of the college and university professors.
The relationship between those figures and the his-
tory of unequal treatment afforded to the Negro cannot
be denied. At every point from birth to death the impact
of the past is reflected in the still disfavored position of
the Negro.
In light of the sorry history of discrimination and its
devastating impact on the lives of Negroes, bringing the
Negro into the mainstream of American life should be a
state interest of the highest order. To fail to do so is to
ensure that America will forever remain a divided soci-
ety. 267
Regrettably very little has changed in the economic status of
African-Americans since Justice Marshall's remarks in 1978, 268 In
this author's view, Congress need not rely on Justice Marshall's
moral imperatives, although it is certainly free to do so: witness the
Reparations Act for the Japanese wrongfully interned by the United
States in World War 11. 269
A. The Important Governmental Purpose
To satisfy the Court's demand for an "important governmental
purpose" as articulated in Metro Broadcasting, Congress should cite
267
 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,395-96 (1978) (Marshall, J., concur-
ring) (footnotes omitted).
268 See supra notes 178-207 and accompanying text.
269 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1989-1989c-8 (1988).
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the shifting workplace demographics, the poor quality of educa-
tional opportunity often found in minority schools and the need
for workplace diversity. Race-conscious preferences subject to the
kinds of limitations discussed below are a powerful and effective
way of integrating minorities into the economic mainstream. That
their integration is necessary can hardly be debated. Minority group
members and women are the workforce of the twenty-first century.
The aging of the white-male workforce, the continued entry of
women into the marketplace and the high birthrate of minority
groups all point to an irreversible trend. The "browning" of the
American labor market is inevitable. Steps must be taken, however,
to insure that minority group members are not concentrated in
entry- and low-level supervisory positions. The "browning" of the
labor force contains within itself the seeds of an apartheid economy.
The absence of persons of color from positions of power and
influence hinders the ability of the United States to compete in
world markets. To survive in a global economy, the American work-
force must be global in color. For American companies to sell their
products and services in an integrated world economy, the Ameri-
can workforce must be integrated. Government must point the way.
Permitting the states to use race as a plus in making employ-
ment and contracting decisions serves the psychic and social needs
of the nation. By helping to place men and women of color in civil
service positions, especially upper and middle management, it fur-
thers the notion of a representative bureaucracy. 2" It ensures that
the economic and class mobility these jobs provided in the past to
ethnic groups excluded by discrimination from private sector jobs
remains available to members of racial groups. On a day-to-day
basis, it bears witness to the non-minority community of minorities'
competence and work ethic. It stands as a rebuke to private sector
employers who fear giving minority managers the latitude and dis-
cretion they readily cede to non-minorities. Similar benefits flow
from MBE programs. In addition, such programs almost always
increase the availability of jobs in minority communities. They bring
home the values of free enterprise and capitalism in ways a thou-
sand times more powerful than any government program or civics
course. 271
A national policy approving race-conscious plans under pre-
determined conditions would also serve to alleviate concerns about
27" See supra notes 171-74 and accompanying text.
271
 See Robert L. Boyd, Black and Asian Self-Employment in Large Metropolitan Areas: A
Comparative Analysis, 37 Soc. PROBS. 258, 269 (1990).
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the alleged social stigma attached to receipt of such preferences.
From Bakke to the present, the Court has asserted that race-based
classifications must not stigmatize their beneficiaries, branding them
incapable of competing on their own merits. 272 The standard reply
to the stigma charge invoked compensatory justifications based on
historical and contemporary discrimination. Some prominent mi-
nority scholars have recently revived the charge, however, and
tendered their support. 273
 Congressional legislation would lessen
that charge's sting by acknowledging the impact of unconscious
racism and prejudice.
Fullilove and Metro Broadcasting confirmed the sweeping powers
vested in Congress by Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 274
The various opinions of the "majority" Justices in Fullilove carefully
noted the data available to, and actually used by, Congress in en-
acting the MBE set-aside. 275 In Metro Broadcasting, the majority opin-
ion placed great weight on the information available to Congress
and the FCC demonstrating the connection between minority own-
ership and "diversity" programming. 276
 Unless the Court were to
do a complete about-face in an openly political decision, the prin-
cipled application of precedent would compel it to defer to a
Congressional determination that the benefits of race-conscious
preferences constitute an "important interest" sufficient to satisfy
the first prong of the intermediate test.
B. Substantially Related Means
At the heart of affirmative action lies the Gordian knot of
fairness: how to ensure equality of opportunity in employment and
public contracting without depriving non-minorities of jobs, pro-
motions and contracts that the market might otherwise award them.
Attempts to unfasten the knot without fraying its laces have occu-
pied too much judicial, legislative and administrative time. Neither
272 E.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989); Bakke, 438
U.S. at 298 (Powell, J., concurring).
273
 STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE AGT1ON BABY (1991); Steele,
supra note 227. See also Don Wycliff, Blacks Debate the Cost of Affirmative Action, N.Y. TIMES,
June 10, 1990, 4, at 3. But .see Hosea L. Martin, A Few Kind Words for Affirmative Action,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 25, 1991, at A15.
2" See supra notes 126-62 and accompanying text.
273
 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 463-67 (1980); id. at 504-05 (Powell, J„ concur-
ring).
27" Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v, FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3011-25 (1990).
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political theory nor moral discourse has proved capable of supplying
the dexterity needed.
Rather than despair, Congress should codify the principles the
Court has laid down in cases approving the implementation of race-
conscious preferences. Its jurisprudence of affirmative action strives
for fairness and hews a standard for rough justice. "Innocence,"
"trammeling" and "self-destruction" function as measures of statu-
tory and constitutional fairness. By adopting the Court's measures,
Congress could easily satisfy Metro Broadcasting's demand for a sub-
stantial relationship between the proposed legislation's end and
means.
The contours of such a statute are not hard to imagine. To
protect "innocent" non-minorities, 277 Congress should outlaw two
frequently criticized (but rarely occurring) devices: race-conscious
layoffs and quotas. 278 The Court has clearly signalled its deep-seated
hostility to race-conscious layoffs in the absence of clear proof of
prior discrimination. 279 Prudence as well as fairness dictate that
Congress eliminate manipulation of layoff rules from a list of ac-
ceptable race-conscious devices available to public sector employers.
Because quotas suggest rigidity and resemble a command to fill slots
regardless of the applicant's qualifications, the Court views them as
per se . invalid. Quotas, moreover, seem particularly harmful to in-
nocence by denying individual review and consideration. Congress
therefore should outlaw them.
Outlawing quotas and layoffs may protect innocent non-mi-
norities but it is not sufficient to prevent the trammeling of their
interests. Congress must also address the use of goals and time-
tables. As noted earlier, critics, including Justice Scalia, have argued
that, at their worst, goals and timetables result in the hiring "by the
numbers" of unqualified candidates and, at their best, result in the
hiring of minimally qualified candidates.'" A ban on goals and
timetables makes no practical sense, however. They are valuable
177
	 pressing this suggestion, I do not disavow the powerful argument that non-
minorities are never really "innocent" because they have benefited from the systematic
suppression of minorities. E.g„ Ross, supra note 82; Sullivan, supra note 82. The suggestion
is a pragmatic concession to political reality.
777 Congress used precisely this technique in the Civil Rights Act of 1992, section 106 of
which prohibits race n orming of employment-related tests. See supra note 46. Section 106
does not, however, require employers to hire on a test performance scale. It leaves enormous
discretion with employers to decide how much weight to give test results.
777
 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,282-83 (1986) (Powell, J.); id. at 294-
95 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
770 See supra note 47.
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tools of measurement and accountability. 28 ' They provide concrete
benchmarks with which to counteract the intangible "built-in head-
winds" Griggs decried. Goals and timetables measure the fairness of
selection processes. They can also prod an otherwise reluctant bu-
reaucracy in which resistance to change is institutionalized. 282 They
enable upper-level corporate employees to formulate concrete ob-
jectives for middle-management implementation. As Professor Dav-
idson has observed:
All institutions have plans for finances or employment that
utilize numbers and timetables. If such procedures make
sense to measure cash flow and production goals in our
business and educational institutions, then why would they
not be considered appropriate to measure the inclusion
of underrepresented minorities and women in the work-
place?283
Justice Scalia's charge, moreover, merits rebuttal. No company
in the face of a recessionary economy and unprecedented compe-
tition from foreign industries and no state bureaucracy in the face
of declining budgetary resources can sacrifice productivity for the
benefit of distribution of employment opportunities along racial
lines. While this kind of abuse undoubtedly existed in some in-
stances, when industry and government personnel offices were first
experimenting with goals and timetables, such abuses are most un-
likely after nearly twenty-five years of experience and implemen-
tation. Using goals and timetables as measurements of accountability
does not drive the marketplace into hiring by the numbers. It drives
the marketplace to more efficient recruiting of qualified minorities,
to more effective in-house career development programs and to
closer attention to the talents of minority employees and appli-
cants.2"
In Metro Broadcasting, the Court warned against race-conscious
preferences not tightly moored to the qualified minority population
of the implementing jurisdiction. While sound policy dictates that
Congress should not enact detailed, encumbered legislation, Con-
2"' See generally HAMMERMAN, supra note 62, at 14-15; David H. Rosenbloom, What Have
Policy Studies Told Us About Affirmative Action and Where Can We Co from Here?, 4 Poi..'v STUD.
Rev. 43 (1984).
282 Herbert Hammerman, Affirmative Action Stalemate: A Second Perspective, 93 PUB. IN-
TEREST 130, 133 (1988).
2" Mary Davidson, Reflections on Affirmative Action—I987, 15 J. INTERGROUP REL. 22, 24-
25 (1987-88).
2" Id. at 2-4, 14-15,
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gress certainly should heed the Court's warning by providing guid-
ance for state and municipal determinations of factual predicates.
It should instruct state officials to consider the eight factors iden-
tified by the Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCCP) for
conducting an underutilization analysis of a federal contractor's
workforce. 285
Consideration of these factors meets another trammeling ob-
jection as well. In City of Richmond, the Court faulted the MBE
program for allowing "Eskimos, Aleuts, and Native-Americans" to
claim preferred status. 28° The Court reasoned that if Richmond had
discriminated at all, it had discriminated against members of its
principal minority population, i.e., African-Americans. That con-
clusion strikes both an intuitive and rational chord. One reason why
race-conscious plans have provoked the ire of so many non-minor-
ities is the inclusion of beneficiaries whose designation has no his-
torical justification. It is one thing to acknowledge the discrimination
suffered by African-Americans over the years at the hands of the
public and private sector in Richmond. After all, it is historically
indisputable that Richmond was the former capital of the Confed-
eracy and a staunch opponent of Brown and the Voting Rights Act.
It is quite another thing to suggest that Eskimos, Aleuts, Native
Americans—and perhaps even Latinos—have suffered the same
egregious treatment. By the same token, race-conscious preferences
for Asian-Americans—but not for African-Americans—may make
sense in the state of Washington. 287 By structuring race-conscious
preferences around the actual minority presence in the local labor
sea
	 eight factors are:
1. the minority population of the labor area surrounding the facility;
2. the size of the minority unemployment force in the labor area surrounding
the facility;
3. the percentage of the minority workforce as compared with the total work-
force in the immediate labor area;
4. the general availability of minorities having the requisite skills in the imme-
diate labor area;
5. the availability of minorities having the requisite skills in an area in which
the contractor can reasonably recruit;
6. the availability of promotable and transferable minorities within the contrac-
tor's organization;
7. the existence of training institutions capable of training persons in the req-
uisite skills; and
8. the degree of training which the contractor is reasonably able to undertake
as a means of making all job classes available to minorities.
Revised Order No. 4, 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.11(b)(1) (1990).
u8
 488 U.S. 469, 506 (1989).
27 See Defunis v. Ogedaard, 416 U.S. 312, 338-40 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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and entrepreneurial market, Congress not only satisfies constitu-
tional imperatives, but it also diminishes public perceptions of un-
fairness. History, geography and common sense combine to sap
accusations of trammeling of their vitality.
Statutory adoption of guidelines like the OFCCP's will require
public sector employers and contracting officials to undertake so-
phisticated measurements of local labor and entrepreneurial re-
sources. To measure availability, employers and contracting officials
must survey both the existing and potential pool in terms of num-
bers and percentages of qualified candidates and entrepreneurs. 288
This survey extends far beyond a passing familiarity with census
tables and statistical abstracts. It requires officials first to inventory
job and task content and then to match that inventory against data
showing the number and percentage of minorities who possess the
skills identified. 289 Admittedly, this is not an easy task. But crafting
race-conscious preference plans should not be easy. Their political
acceptability rests on their being carefully constructed in terms of
reach as well as beneficiaries.
Notions of fairness, hoWever, dictate upward adjustments from
the status quo in some instances. Congress should make one ad-
justment to the OFCCP factors. Reliance on the present racial strat-
ification of the local labor and entrepreneurial pools rewards years
of disparate treatment, disparate impact and identified discrimina-
tion. 29° In considering the legislation proposed in this article, Con-
gress should invite expert testimony on mechanisms that would
allow for adjusting goals and timetables to compensate for past
exclusion without forcing hiring or promotion of unqualified or
minimally qualified candidates, or contracting with unqualified or
minimally qualified MBEs. 29 '
288 WALTER B. CONNOLLY, JR. & MICHAEL J. CONNOLLY, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 508 (rev. ed. 1979).
289
 One of the fatal flaws in the City of Richmond's plan was its selection of a 30% set-
aside. While that figure was roughly between the percentage of minority group members in
the general population and the percentage of local minority contractors, the Court found
that figure too imprecise. School boards too have ignored this requirement, resulting in the
Supreme Court's invalidating plans whose goals corresponded to the percentage of minority
group students in the school district and not the percentage of qualified minority teachers
in the appropriate labor area. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
See also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,274-76 (1986).
29" For an explanation of these terms, see supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text;
Daly, supra note 34, at 1111 n.267.
"' Proponents of race-conscious preferences must accept, however, that adjustment may
not be feasible. Authentic sociological and statistical objections may interpose themselves.
Political realities may present insurmountable barriers.
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Finally, Congress must insist upon the self-destruction of pro-
grams containing race-conscious preferences. Haunting the Court's
jurisprudence is the specter of entrenched distribution of social
goods along racial lines. To dispel this possibility, the Court has
insisted that race-conscious preferences are tolerable only to achieve
racial parity and not to maintain it. Thus, it has examined affir-
mative action plans to insure a projected termination date or event.
If the implementing official has taken care in setting the plan's
percentage goals, the official should have little difficulty in fixing a
termination date or event.
The concept of self-destruction is hard to apply to MBE pro-
grams. Most programs last only a few years or sometimes only one.
They terminate by expenditure of appropriated funds, not by
achievement of a percentage goal in a job category. MBE programs
are also different from race-conscious plans in employment because
one critical goal of MBE programs is to assist minority businesses
in moving from servicing the public sector to servicing the private
sector. Critics have charged that too often MBEs remain govern-
ment contractors and never move into the private sector as origi-
nally intended. In contrast, public sector race-conscious employ-
ment plans are never adopted with the goal of encouraging their
beneficiaries to abandon public sector employment. In light of these
differences, Congress should encourage the states to adopt addi-
tional measures designed to integrate MBEs into the private sector
construction industry. Rewarding majority construction companies
for using minority subcontractors on private sector jobs would easily
advance this goal. Congress should specifically permit the states, if
they so wish, to add to their calculus of most responsible bidder a
formula for crediting non-minority firms for doing business with
MBEs on private sector jobs.
By insisting upon criteria for plans' self-destruction, Congress
would be sending a very important message to society at large, not
merely to the individuals and institutions affected by the new leg-
islation. The message needs little elaboration: "[l]t is both too late
and too soon to be color-blind."292 The inclusion of a specific ter-
minating event or criteria is a powerful symbol of the legislation's
remedial purpose. The legislation does not represent a permanent
parceling out of benefits. It is a temporary measure. It reminds
society that race-conscious preferences are not "endless in their
292 NAT HENTOFF, THE NEW EQUALITY 114 (1964).
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reach into the future."293 They are a tool of limited temporal exis-
tence. Society is color-conscious today in order to be color-blind in
the future. 294
Even more important than any particular substantive provision
suggested in this article is the national consensus that Congress must
forge ahead to create a policy of economic inclusion. All members
of society suffer burdens peculiar to their economic or social status
to enable the state to operate for the good of the entire body politic.
In time of war, for example, the draft targets young healthy men.
The old and infirm escape this military obligation. The explanation
for the distinction is utilitarian. The young and healthy make better
soldiers. The criteria neither stigmatizes the draftees nor those
excluded. If the draft does not constitute an impermissible burden,
neither should race-conscious preferences. 295
CONCLUSION
Both the Court and the Bush Administration have castigated
affirmative action programs as leading to, in Justice O'Connor's
words, "a politics of racial hostility. "296 President Bush described
them as the "pit[ting] of one [racial] group against another." 297 To
the extent a politics of racial hostility exists, it is because politicians
have exploited affirmative action for their own purposes. 298 Rather
than create a national consensus on the need to foster the economic
integration of minorities, one part of which would involve the lim-
ited use of race-conscious preferences, politicians have used affir-
mative action as a tool of divisiveness. If they stopped fueling the
293 See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 469, 497-98 (1989); Wygant, 476
U.S. at 275-76.
294
 LiviNosProN, supra note 107, at 99. Race-conscious preferences resemble a vaccine. In
order to avoid the serious illness of racism, with its fatal political, social and economic
consequences, the body politic voluntarily submits itself to a controlled dose of racism.
295 I am indebted to Professor Fullinwider for the draft analogy. FULLINWIDER, supra note
40, at 247.
2" City of Richmond, 488 U.S. at 493.
292 Adam Clymer, Bush Assails 'Quota Bill' at West Point Graduation, N.Y. TIMES, June 2,
1991, at L32.
296
	 "politics of racial hostility" was sharply demonstrated in the debate over the Civil
Rights Bill of 1990. See S. REP. No. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); H.R. REP. No. 4000,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). The President vetoed the bill, insisting its language would
encourage employers to adopt race/gender quotas to avoid the expense of discrimination
lawsuits. Steven A. Holmes, President Vetoes Bill On Jobs Rights; Showdown 15 Set, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 23, 1990, at A 1. Efforts to achieve a politically acceptable compromise to accommodate
the President's concerns took months.'
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fire with denunciations, the issue itself would lose much of its con-
tentiousness.
While the "politics of racial hostility" has a nice rhetorical ring
to it, upon analysis the threat is hollow. Racial hostility is what
occurred after Brown v. Board of Education. The violence and physical
unrest that marked the South's resistance to integration are politics
of racial hostility. 2' George Wallace's campaigning on a platform
calling for an end to the life tenure of Supreme Court Justices is
politics of racial hostility. The "impeach Earl Warren" platform of
the John Birch Society is politics of racial hostility.
There has been no large-scale outcry against MBE set-asides.
Indeed, the primary opposition comes from contractor associations
who are interested more in preserving the status quo than in politics,
racial or otherwise. Empirical data collected before City of Richmond
suggested that 75 percent of implementing authorities encounter
no opposition and the remainder "some" difficulty. Only approxi-
mately 10 percent had their program challenged in judicial pro-
ceedings. 30° The same is true of race-conscious preferences in public
employment.
In enacting legislation permitting the states to adopt race-con-
scious preferences, Congress must point to the social and economic
enhancement flowing from its decision. The economic benefits are
not hard to describe. Employment opportunities that improve the
economic mobility of minority group members will obviously re-
bound to the benefit of the minority community. As increasing
numbers of minorities hold more responsible and better-paying
jobs, the minority community gains greater average income and
stronger ties to the marketplace. Economic success generates "im-
mediate" role models in the community. They are immediate in the
sense that they can be seen, talked with, and solicited for advice—
unlike distant role models such as major league sports figures and
entertainers. These immediate role models are daily witnesses to
the rewards flowing from education, employment and entrepre-
neurism. They celebrate the value of steady toil as a union member,
a civil servant, a private contractor.
ng E.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) ("extreme public hostility" manifested by
the Governor of Arkansas calling out the National Guard to prevent integration of a local
high school); Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (school board closed public
schools and funded segregated private schools for white children).
'a" Leslie A. Nay & James E. Jones, Jr., Equal Employment and Affirmative Action in Local
Governments: A Profile, 8 L. & INEQ. J. 103,120-21 (1989).
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te.
Failing to take into account the changing racial composition of
the United States labor force has serious and immediate conse-
quences to the individual job holder or entrepreneur, to the em-
ploying enterprise or marketplace and to the nation as a whole.
From the perspective of the minority job holder or the entrepre-
neur, the work and market places are stagnant, holding no promise
of growth. Little reason exists to work hard and efficiently if the
reward system does not function because of unconscious racism and
bias. From the perspective of the employer or the marketplace,
poor morale takes a heavy toll, damaging human as well as physical
capital. From the perspective of the nation, the Department of
Labor has well summed up the damage. Exclusion
hinders not only individuals, but society as a whole. It
effectively cuts our pool of potential corporate leaders by
eliminating over one-half of our population. It deprives
our economy of new leaders, new sources of creativity—
the 'would be' pioneers of the business world. If our end
game is to compete successfully in today's global market,
then we have to unleash the full potential of the American
workforce. 3°'
In exercising its factfinding powers Congress must make it clear
that the benefits of affirmative action extend beyond the minority
community. As minorities in increasing numbers occupy higher-
level positions in public employment and obtain a fairer share of
public sector contracting, racism will be sapped of some of its
strength. As increasing numbers of minority groups enter the mid-
dle class, the stereotype of minority (and the less than subtle charges
of shiftlessness, welfare dependency, etc.) will diminish. The more
minorities are seen in positions of economic regularity, the more
tolerant majority group members will become, and the more private
sector careers will become accessible.
Congress must recognize that the equal access construct has
lost its potency as an antidiscrimination remedy. New strategies to
ensure the economic inclusion of minorities are desperately needed
as the nation approaches the twenty-first century. A racially just
society requires equality of opportunity. Only Congress can give
back to the states what the Supreme Court has taken away. Now is
the time to rebuild the City of Richmond.
' I GLASS CEILING, supra note 13, at 2.
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APPENDIX
Equal
	
Equal
Case
	 Access	 Achievement	 Comment
x
x
Regents of the Univ. of Cal.
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978) (Equal Protection
Clause claim brought by a
rejected white applicant chal-
lenging a special admissions
program to a state medical
school that reserved 16 out
of a 100 seats exclusively for-
minority applicants).
United Steelworkers of Am.
v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193
(1979) (Title VII claim
brought by a white employee
challenging the implementa-
tion by a private sector em-
ployer of a training pro-
gram, admission to which
was determined by the appli-
cant's race).
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448
U.S. 448 (1980) (Equal Pro-
tection Clause claim brought
by white contractors chal-
lenging a provision of the
Public Works Employment
Act of 1977 that set aside
10% of the funds appropri-
ated pursuant to the statute
for minority business enter-
prises).
The striking down of the
exclusive reservation of 16
seats for minorities is an
endorsement of the equal
access construct; the
approval of race as a "plus"
is an endorsement of the
equal achievement construct.
The Court's approval of the
setting aside of trainee slots
based on race is an endorse-
ment of the equal achieve-
ment construct. Supporting
this characterization is the
Court's refusal to condition
the selection of the black
trainees on proof of actual
victimization by the employer
and its choice of a sweeping
statistical baseline to measure
the racial composition of the
employer's workforce.
'['he Court's approval of the
10% MBE set-aside is an en-
dorsement of the equal
achievement construct. Sup-
porting this characterization
are: the Court's quick, un-
questioning approval of Con-
gress's selection of the 10%
figure; its relaxed, almost
nonexistent, requirement of
government responsibility
for the low participation of
minority business enterprises
in public contracting; and its
casual discussion of whether
the participating minority
business enterprises had to
be actual victims of discrimi-
nation by the government.
x
	
x
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Firefighters Local Union No.
1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561
(1984) (Title VII claim
brought by a union objecting
to a district court order
modifying a consent judg-
ment to prevent the layoff of
recently hired minority fire-
fighters).
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986)
(Equal Protection Clause
claim brought by non-minor-
ity school teachers challeng-
ing a modified layoff proce-
dure that retained minority
teachers with less seniority at
the expense of non-minority
teachers with greater senior-
ity).
By restricting the district
court's authority to modify a
consent judgment to protect
newly hired minority fire-
fighters, the Court gave
greater weight to the equal
access construct (i.e., minor-
ity and non-minority fire-
fighters were being treated
in the same fashion). It re-
fused to allow the district to
give minorities "catch-up"
points that would have had
the effect of recognizing how
long the city had excluded
them from access these jobs.
Its refusal constituted a re-
jection of the equal achieve-
ment construct. Further-
more, the Court's opinion
contained dicta suggesting
that Title VII relief was lim-
ited to actual victims of dis-
crimination. This dicta
clearly manifested an en-
dorsement of the equal ac-
cess construct. Note, how-
ever, that a majority of the
Justices disavowed the Stotts
dicta in Local 28 of Sheet
Metal Workers' Intl Ass'n v.
EEOC, 478 U.S. at 471-75
(1986) (four-Justice plurality
opinion); id. at 484 (Powell,
J., concurring); id. at 499
(White, J., dissenting).
The Court's disapproval of a
layoff provision designed to
retain newly hired minority
teachers reflects an endorse-
ment of the equal access con-
struct. Supporting this char-
acterization are: the
opinion's rejection of reme-
diation of societal discrimina-
tion and the role-model justi-
fication for race/gender-
conscious preferences; and
its refusal to remand the case
for factual clarification in
light of the unseemly state of
the record.
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Local 28, Sheet Metal Work-
ers' Intl Ass'n v. EEOC, 478
U.S. 421 (1986) (Title VII
claim brought by non-minor-
ity union members to set
aside a judicially mandated
29% membership goal that
the district court imposed
following a finding of egre-
gious discrimination).
Local Number 93, Ind Ass'n
of Firefighters v. City of
Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501
(1986) (Title VII claim
brought by non-minority fi-
refighters challenging a con-
sent judgment, signed by the
city and a black firefighters
association, that called fur
promotion quotas).
United States v. Paradise,
480 U.S. 149 (1987) (Equal
Protection Clause Claim
brought by non-minority
state troopers to upset a ju-
dicially mandated 50/50 pro-
motion plan that the district
court imposed following
finding of egregious discrim-
ination).
'rise Court's opinion dis-
played a decided preference
for the equal achievement
construct (I) by permitting
the district court to order
preferential relief for indi-
viduals who were not specifi-
cally the object of the union's
discriminatory practices; and
(2) by refusing to consider
the union's claim that the
district court's selection of a
29% minority membership
goal far exceeded the per-
centage of minorities in the
relevant labor force. Tem-
pering this preference is the
Court's emphasis on the
egregious character of the
defendant's refusal to ob-
serve the strictures of Title
V11 and its contumacy in
face of repeated court orders
to cease its discriminatory
practices. The Court appears
to be endorsing the equal
achievement construct as a
last resort, when all else to
achieve equal access.
In holding that section
706(g) did not apply to con-
sent judgments, the Court
endorsed the equal achieve-
ment construct by allowing
employers to use rate-Con-
scious preferences without
fear of challenge under that
provision. In addition, it
used City of Cleveland as a ve-
hicle for retreating from the
sweeping equal access lan-
guage it used in Stotts,
The Court's approval of a
race-conscious, one-for-one
promotion quota reflects the
equal achievement construct.
At the same time, its re-
peated insistence on the out-
rageous character of defen-
dant's behavior and the
qualifications of the minority
troopers benefited by the
quota reflect values consis-
tent with the equal access
construct.
x
	
x
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Johnson v. Transportation
Agency, Santa Clara County,
Cal., 480 U.S. 616 (1987)
(Title VII claim brought by a
male whose supervisor de-
nied him a promotion, se-
lecting an arguably less qual-
ified woman).
City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469
(1989) (Equal Protection
Clause claim brought by
white contractors challenging
a municipal ordinance set-
ting aside 30% of certain
public works appropriations
for minority business enter-
prises).
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990)
(Equal Protection challenge
to two FCC policies using
race-conscious features in
awarding licenses for radio
and television stations).
The Court's approval of an
immutable characteristic
(sex) as a "plus" is an en-
dorsement of the equal
achievement construct, as is
the Court's selection of gen-
eral population statistics to
measure the discriminatory
impact the employer's per-
sonnel decisions.
The Court's championing of
the strict scrutiny standard
of review for state-sponsored
race-conscious plans effec-
tively bars their adoption. It
amounts to a complete
triumph for the equal access
construct.
By adopting the intermediate
standard of review, liberally
reviewing evidence of Con-
gress's approval of the chal-
lenged FCC policies, and
broadly interpreting Con-
gress's power to eradicate so-
cietal discrimination, the
Court embraced the equal
achievement construct.
